What Has Love Got to Do With It?: Sentimental Attachments and Legal Decision-Making by Markell, David et al.
Florida State University College of Law
Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Publications
2012
What Has Love Got to Do With It?: Sentimental
Attachments and Legal Decision-Making
David Markell
Tom Tyler
Sarah F. Brosnan
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Law Commons, and the Psychology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Markell, Tom Tyler, and Sarah F. Brosnan, What Has Love Got to Do With It?: Sentimental Attachments and Legal Decision-Making
Vill. L. Rev. 209 (2012),
Available at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/63
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-2\VLR201.txt unknown Seq: 1  6-AUG-12 12:12
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 57 2012 NUMBER 2
Articles
WHAT HAS LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT?: SENTIMENTAL
ATTACHMENTS AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING
DAVID MARKELL,* TOM TYLER,‡ AND SARAH F. BROSNAN†
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE is burgeoning literature about the “behavioral era” in law—i.e.,an era that seeks to conform the law to emerging understandings of
what makes people tick.1  The basic concept rests on two key assumptions.
First, individuals are not always rational economic actors.2  This is, by now,
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Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia.  We are thankful to Professors
Elizabeth Burch, Nicole Stelle Garnett, Daniel R. Mandelker, and Mark
Spottswood for input on the project; to our research assistants Christian Cutillo,
Lauren Evens, Angelina Perez, Katherine Weber, and Xiaolin Zhao; to the Florida
State University College of Law for financial and other support; and to the
National Science Foundation for support of Professor Brosnan (NSF HSD grant
SES 0729244 and NSF CAREER award SES 0847351).  Please direct any comments
or questions to dmarkell@law.fsu.edu, tom.tyler@yale.edu, or sbrosnan@gsu.edu.
1. See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Regulation in the Behavioral Era,
95 MINN. L. REV. 715 (2011) (describing recent trend to account for behavior in
formulating regulations).
2. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Re-
moving the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051,
1055-66, 1070 (2000) (noting that “[t]here is simply too much credible experimen-
tal evidence that individuals frequently act in ways that are incompatible with the
assumptions of rational choice theory” and describing several variations of rational
choice theory including “wealth maximization version” that predicts that “actors
will attempt to maximize their financial well-being or monetary situation”);
Vandenbergh et al., supra note 1, at 730 (“Although there are multiple interpreta-
tions of [rational choice theory], a common assumption is that individuals are ra-
tional actors whose decisions are driven by the desire to maximize utility given
resource constraints. . . .  Ultimately, decisions are made on the basis of a deliber-
ate analysis of the expected payoffs of a set of options, considering both their desir-
ability and their probability of occurring.” (footnotes omitted)). See generally
Andrew M. Colman, Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Ration-
ality in Social Interaction, 26 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 139, 139-43 (2003) (describing
weaknesses of rational choice theory).
(209)
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well established as a matter of fact.3  Second, as a normative matter, it
therefore is appropriate, and important, to structure legal regimes (the
law and the institutions that make and administer it) so that they are re-
sponsive to this emerging understanding of “behavioral realities.”4  Better
alignment of our legal system and people’s desires will build confidence in
government, enhance legitimacy, and promote compliance with the deci-
sions of legal authorities.5
There has been substantial work to improve the understanding of
human behavior relevant to design of legal procedures.  Significant ad-
vances have been made and we know much more about peoples’ interests,
behaviors, and biases now than in the past.6  Similarly, we are beginning to
“operationalize” this emerging understanding of human behavior in terms
of how it might relate to the law and governance mechanisms.  For exam-
ple, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is making efforts to
foster integration of such insights into the operation of the administrative
state, including the operation of our agencies.  In its 2009 report to Con-
gress, the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA)
highlights consideration of “behaviorally informed approaches” to regula-
tion as one of three “potential reforms that might improve regulatory pol-
icy and analysis.”7  OIRA suggests that “[w]ith an accurate understanding
of human behavior, agencies would be in a position to suggest innovative,
effective, and low-cost methods of achieving regulatory goals.”8  OIRA
identifies the endowment effect, which it characterizes as “loss aversion, in
the sense that [people] dislike losses far more than they like correspond-
3. For a further discussion of the research in the eminent domain arena, see
infra notes 118-216 and accompanying text.
4. See generally Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 2 (arguing that law and econom-
ics can reinvigorate itself with more nuanced understanding of human behavior
that draws on cognitive psychology, sociology, and other behavioral sciences).
This new scholarly paradigm would be called “law and behavioral science.” See id.
at 1057.  As Judge Posner and others have recognized, there has been considerable
work to bring insights from the psychology and sociology literatures and empirical
findings to increase understanding of legal regimes. See Richard A. Posner, The
Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 769
(1987) (discussing impact other disciplines have on understanding of law).
5. See Emanuela Carbonara et al., Legal Innovation and the Compliance Paradox,
9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 837, 841-42 (2008) (“It is generally recognized that the
alignment of legal precepts and decisions of authorities with current social norms
and values has a positive influence on people’s compliance with law, even when it
is not in their self-interest to do so.  Legitimacy is undermined when the content of
the law departs from social norms, be they based on moral, ethical, or merely cul-
tural values.”).
6. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 1 (discussing increasing acceptance of
behavioral realities).
7. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2009
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 4, 35-37 (2009) [here-
inafter 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS].
8. Id. at 35-36.
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ing gains,” as an example of an insight from the social science literature
that the regulatory state should incorporate into its policy making.9
Our underlying premise is that improving understanding of human
motivations, not only in the abstract but also in the context of existing
governance mechanisms, is an indispensable building block for operation-
alizing a behavioral era.  In other words, foundational work in understand-
ing human perspectives and in assessing the effectiveness of existing
institutions in responding to human concerns is critical to improving our
regulatory state and the institutions that comprise it.  We have contributed
to this literature in previous work, in which we have argued for the use of
public evaluations as one basis for deciding how (and whether) to regulate
decisions with public consequences and explored the effectiveness of dif-
ferent processes based on public preferences.10
Our purpose in the study that we present in this Article is to build on
this previous work by adding important insights about both peoples’ pref-
erences and the responsiveness of different institutions to those prefer-
ences.  As indicated above, there is a rich literature that strongly suggests
that people attach sentimental as well as monetary value to some items and
do not look at issues solely from a rational economic perspective.11  Our
Article, which discusses several important findings from a survey we con-
ducted of peoples’ preferences for different decision-making processes for
resolving land use disputes in Florida, builds on this foundation in at least
five important ways.  First, our findings show that people bring a range of
values to their evaluation of decision-making processes.  That is, our find-
ings show that people bring sentimental as well as monetary values to their
consideration of the adequacy of different procedures, and that the
9. Id. at 36-37.
10. See generally David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to
Design Government Citizen Participation Processes: A Case Study of Citizens’ Roles in Envi-
ronmental Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2008); Tom Tyler &
David Markell, The Public Regulation of Land-Use Decisions: Criteria for Evaluating Alter-
native Procedures, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 538 (2009).
11. For a further discussion of the fact that people do not solely view issues
from a rational economic perspective, see supra note 2 and accompanying text and
infra notes 119-217 and accompanying text.  By monetary values we refer to the
economic gains and losses associated with a transaction, for example the value of
one’s home.  Sentimental values refer to the emotional attachment that people
have which shape the psychological sense of gain or loss that would result from a
transaction.  When people feel a sense of great loss because they have had to sell
and move out of a home they have lived in for decades, this loss is not due simply
to any decline in monetary value that they may have experienced.  It is also due to
a non-monetary loss linked to their feelings about their house.  A more immediate
example of this additional loss is provided by the endowment effect.  If you give
someone a cup that is worth five dollars and then seek to buy it back, you will
typically find that the person wants more than five dollars for that cup.  The cup,
once someone possesses it, acquires additional value in the owner’s eyes immedi-
ately upon possession, and thereby acquires greater value to the owner than it
would be viewed as having by a neutral outsider (who could buy a similar mug in a
store for less).
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amount of weight people attach to monetary and sentimental values af-
fects their views about how well different procedures protect their inter-
ests.12  This finding lends support to those who believe that we should
structure legal regimes in light of the reality that people are not always
rational economic actors.
Second, we generated several findings about the acceptability of judi-
cial litigation, the process on which we primarily focus in this Article.  Our
survey respondents viewed judicial litigation as the most preferred process
overall, and also as the best for protecting economic interests.13  In con-
trast, our respondents did not give judicial litigation high marks for pro-
tecting sentimental values.14  Other procedures we studied, including
referenda, did much better when sentimental values were important.15
Thus, our findings provide insights concerning the comparative advan-
tages of different types of decision-making processes, including judicial lit-
igation, in different contexts.
A third series of important findings offers some insights as to why our
respondents preferred judicial litigation, notably that the respondents
viewed judicial litigation as a neutral process.  Related to this, our findings
reflect that when monetary interests are important, stakeholders accept
decisions made by an arbiter who they perceive to be neutral.  That is, they
define fairness in terms of neutrality.16  Other features of decision-mak-
ing, such as voice and quality of treatment, carried much less weight.17
A fourth set of key findings sheds light on what it would take for our
respondents to believe that judicial litigation would adequately protect
sentimental values.  Our respondents believed that procedural justice is
particularly important when sentimental values are important.18  Further,
we found that a particular feature of procedural justice discussed in the
procedural justice literature—trust in the decision-maker (the judge in ju-
12. For a further discussion of our survey’s findings, see infra notes 86-118
and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 86-118 and accompanying text.  The preference for judicial
litigation in their overall rankings of processes provides some support for the idea
that our respondents gave monetary interests more weight than sentimental inter-
ests but we did not ask specific questions to test this and do not discuss this relative
weighting in detail in this Article.
14. See infra notes 86-118 and accompanying text.  We asked about five differ-
ent types of procedures, ranging from civil judicial litigation to referendums.  An
interesting finding of our study is that, despite the professed interest in sentimen-
tal value, people still generally preferred litigation, which was seen to maximize
economic interests and, as the text reflects, did not do particularly well when senti-
mental values were important.
15. See infra notes 86-118 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 86-118 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 86-118 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 90 and accompanying text (depicting “Table 2: What fea-
tures shape the view that courts protect value?”).
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dicial litigation)—is key to protection of sentimental values.19  In order to
create an atmosphere of trust, it was particularly important that judges
provide opportunities for voice, make it clear that their decisions had
been made neutrally, and show respect for people and their rights.20
These findings about the process features that are important when senti-
mental values predominate hold promise for improving satisfaction with
judicial litigation by pointing the way for process designers to incorporate
and highlight such features when sentimental values are salient.
A fifth and final finding that is of particular interest for at least two
reasons is that preferences for processes depend in part on exogenous
factors.  Our findings show that one exogenous factor, notably the back-
ground level of trust in local government, influences peoples’ preferences
for different processes.21  Those with a high degree of trust proved rela-
tively comfortable with government processes in which government offi-
cials have the final say (including judicial litigation), while respondents
with low levels of trust preferred processes that left power in the hands of
the people (e.g., through referenda).22  Low-trust respondents apparently
had more confidence in their fellow citizens than in their representatives,
bureaucrats, or judges.23  This intriguing finding highlights the impor-
tance of trust in the litigation setting for issues that have sentimental value.
The key issue to people is trust in judges, who are, after all, government
officials.
Further, it suggests the importance of periodic appraisals of process
design because polling data reflect dramatic changes (declines) in confi-
dence in government in recent years.  Pollster Stanley Greenberg recently
found that trust in government is declining substantially, noting that
“[j]ust a quarter of the country is optimistic about our system of govern-
ment—the lowest since polls by ABC and others began asking this ques-
tion in 1974.”24  Mr. Greenberg’s polling results are by no means
anomalous.  A 2010 Pew survey found that “just 22 % [of all Americans]
say they can trust the government in Washington almost always or most of
the time, among the lowest measures in half a century.”25  Pew reports
19. See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAG-
ING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002) (describing how
trust in judges is crucial to protecting litigants’ sentimental values).
20. For a further discussion of responses to the survey, see infra notes 86-118.
21. See infra notes 86-118.
22. See infra notes 86-118.
23. See infra notes 86-118.
24. Stanley B. Greenberg, Why Voters Tune Out Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
2011, at SR1.
25. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, DISTRUST, DISCONTENT,
ANGER AND PARTISAN RANCOR: THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 2 (2010), avail-
able at www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/606.pdf.  A September 2011 Gallup
poll found that “[a] record-high 81% of Americans are dissatisfied with the way the
country is being governed, adding to negativity that has been building over the
past 10 years.” See Lydia Saad, Americans Express Historic Negativity Toward U.S. Gov-
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-2\VLR201.txt unknown Seq: 6  6-AUG-12 12:12
214 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57: p. 209
that when the National Election Study “first asked this question in 1958,
73% of Americans trusted the government to do what is right just about
always or most of the time.”26  An October 2010 ABC News/Yahoo! News
poll found that only 33% are optimistic about “our system of government
and how well it works,” the lowest number in “nearly a dozen measure-
ments taken across the decades.”27  Thus, our finding about the salience
of trust in government to process preferences suggests the need not only
to pay attention to the predominant values of key stakeholders in design-
ing processes, but also to be mindful of evolving community mores.  Pref-
erences for different processes may be dynamic—they may shift over time
as exogenous factors shift.
The poor performance of judicial litigation in protecting sentimental
values, the salience of trust when sentimental values predominate, and de-
clining levels of such trust28 seemingly create a multi-barreled challenge to
the legitimacy of the court system when it faces decisions that implicate
such values.29  These findings highlight the potential value and promise of
taking action to bolster confidence in litigation when sentimental values
are likely of high importance.
The eminent domain arena, in which a government entity may re-
quire a party to sell its property, provides an intriguing context to consider
our findings.  Two key features of this legal domain that are oft-high-
lighted in relevant literature are that (1) sentimental values frequently are
of significant importance, and (2) there is considerable dissatisfaction with
extant procedures used to resolve disputes.30  Professors Nadler and Dia-
ernment, GALLUP: POLITICS (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/149678/
americans-express-historic-negativity-toward-government.aspx.
26. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, supra note 25, at 13.
27. Gary Langer, Public Optimism Hits a 36-Year Low in Views of the ‘System of
Government’, ABC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Site/page?id=
11965387 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. See Greenberg, supra note 24 (concluding that “distrust of government . . .
is unfolding as a full–blown crisis of legitimacy”).  Greenberg suggests that this
declining sense of trust in government is shifting the political landscape in favor of
Republican governance and that “many voters . . . are turning away from Demo-
crats, Socialists, liberals and progressives.” Id.  We do not take a position on Mr.
Greenberg’s claim but include his suggestion simply to highlight the significant
stakes associated with trust in government.
29. We are not suggesting that courts uniquely require a hard look in this
regard.  Indeed, courts fare better than other institutions according to some
surveys.  For example, we have previously discussed the relatively dismal perform-
ance of local government public hearings, the most frequently used form of dis-
pute resolution for some disputes. See generally Tyler & Markell, supra note 10.
Nevertheless, our findings point to a gap between citizen expectations and
court performance in at least some contexts—notably when sentimental value is
particularly salient—and we believe this finding deserves attention. Cf. James L.
Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory and
“New-Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 59, 72 (2008) (concluding
that campaign contributions and election attack ads lead to reduction in perceived
legitimacy of state courts with elected judges).
30. See infra notes 86-118 and accompanying text.
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mond capture nicely the disconnect between people’s values and extant
judicial processes, observing that “[a]lthough the law of eminent domain
does not recognize distinctions among property owners beyond those re-
flected in the fair market value of the property, public sensibilities include
more.”31  Scholars and others seeking to ameliorate dissatisfaction typi-
cally urge changes to the normative rules by having the courts give more
attention to sentimental values in making compensation decisions or by
narrowing the use of eminent domain.32  Our study suggests the promise
of a different framework based on the procedural justice literature, which
focuses particularly on identifying and incorporating procedural features
that enhance trust.33  In short, our findings suggest the value and impor-
tance of focusing on process as an essential (though by no means exclu-
sive) step in designing procedures that the public will find acceptable.34
More generally, our findings highlight the importance of context in
process design; if a goal of process design is to have processes that are
acceptable to key stakeholders, it is important to understand the values
these stakeholders hold concerning the particular decision involved, and
more generally towards societal governance structures.35  Process prefer-
31. Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychol-
ogy of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 713, 742 (2008).  It is an oversimplification to refer to the “law of
eminent domain” as a single body of law that consists of judicial litigation or as a
single set of procedures.  The variability in approaches that governments use to
acquire property highlights the importance of paying attention to context in for-
mulating possible fixes.  Jurisdictions differ in the procedures they use for eminent
domain. See, e.g., DAVID MCCORD, 7 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § G2A.03
(2011) [hereinafter NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN] (summarizing nature of emi-
nent domain procedures in different states); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected
Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 104, 127-28 (2006) (dis-
cussing pre-condemnation negotiations and use of “quick-take” authority in noting
that “in the vast majority of cases, formal eminent domain proceedings are never
commenced” and observing that there has been “universal disregard for how emi-
nent domain works outside of the courtroom.”).
32. See Garnett, supra note 31, at 110 (noting that “[a]cademic discussions
tend to assume that there are two ways to minimize the risk of undercompensa-
tion,” and referencing two discussed in text); Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at
743 (“Th[e] pattern of results [from their study] suggests that a property rule
might satisfy people in some situations where proposed use is perceived as ques-
tionable; at the same time, our data suggest that variability in use might also be
satisfied by a liability rule, that is, higher compensation when the proposed use is
perceived as questionable.”).
33. We recommend this approach in other areas where sentimental values are
high as well.  We are not taking a position on the appropriate scope of substantive
reform in any area.  Our process suggestions may be considered independent of
substantive reforms, or as complements to them.
34. See Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 748 (discussing implications of
findings).  In their interesting study of concerns with eminent domain law, Profes-
sors Nadler and Diamond identify procedural reform as important to address con-
cerns about subjective attachment and begin to “map out” a possible response. See
id.
35. As the text suggests, a key threshold issue involves identifying the appro-
priate universe of key stakeholders.  For an example regarding the views of owners
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-2\VLR201.txt unknown Seq: 8  6-AUG-12 12:12
216 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57: p. 209
ences vary depending on the strength of different values.  Our findings
suggest the value of using tools from the procedural justice literature to
understand peoples’ preferences and the process features that are most
important to them, and to design processes that align with these
preferences.
Part II explains in more detail the different types of values (monetary
and sentimental) about which we elicited information from the survey par-
ticipants.  Part III reviews our survey methodology.  Part IV contains our
findings and our review of the implications of those findings for process
design.  Part V illustrates the value of our findings by applying them in a
particularly controversial context, notably government’s use of eminent
domain authority to take land at a market price from owners who are not
interested in selling.  Ultimately, our purpose is to examine the idea of
sentimental attachment and consider how it might both enrich our view of
the desirability of decision-making institutions, such as the courts as com-
munity decision-makers, and provide insights about the strategies the
courts and other institutions should use in performing this responsibility
in a way that bolsters legitimacy.
II. MONETARY AND SENTIMENTAL VALUES
Surprisingly little empirical literature has addressed monetary versus
sentimental value.36  Often when an economist or legal scholar speaks of
value, they mean the monetary value.37  This is typically operationalized as
either fair market value or the closely related willingness-to-pay measure,
which is the amount of money someone will pay to acquire an object.38
However, despite the implicit assumption that value is some sort of quanti-
fiable market-based component of an object, growing research indicates
that a number of factors affect valuation and that sentimental factors are
often quite salient.39
The key distinction underlying market-based monetary value is that
the value of something is established through some procedure that in-
volves neutral and fact-based estimation that considers other people’s
sense of worth.  While monetary value involves a subjective evaluation of
these facts, it is neutral in that no one person can define market value
without considering what something is worth to others.  Sentimental value
in eminent domain proceedings, see infra notes 124-27 and 134-67 and accompa-
nying text.
36. One reason for this involves the challenge of adequately creating senti-
mental value in the laboratory in a relatively short experimental session.
37. See, e.g., Jack L. Knetsch & J. A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation
Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J.
ECON. 507 (1984) (describing trend toward defining value in monetary terms).
Note that almost thirty years ago there was evidence that willingness to pay was not
always equivalent to compensation value.
38. See generally id. (operationalizing fair market value as willingness-to-pay).
39. See, e.g., Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31 (discussing sentimental factors’
effect on valuation); Vandenbergh et al., supra note 1 (same).
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is a unique subjective sense of the personal value of some object or rela-
tionship that derives from the fact of ownership, information acquired
about one’s possession, or the formation of an emotional attachment.
The sentimental value of my home to me is not something that is shared
by others, nor that others would recognize, be willing to agree with, or be
willing to pay to acquire the object.  The example we already provided of
the endowment effect provides an example of value derived from the fact
of ownership.  If I am given a cup that can be purchased in a store for five
dollars, the market value of this cup to people in general is the value of
similar mugs available on the market (i.e., five dollars).  The sentimental
attachment that leads me to want to receive seven dollars for that cup is a
personal sense of value connected uniquely to that object by me and is not
something that other people would generally share.  If I tried to sell my
cup on eBay for seven dollars, I would be likely to find that people would
prefer to go to a store and buy a similar cup for five dollars, since they do
not feel the sentiments I do toward my cup.
This distinction between monetary and sentimental value is critically
important in a variety of contexts, particularly in the legal profession,
where juries and judges often make decisions considering the appropriate
value of the commodities at hand.40  The omission of sentimental aspects
of value may leave all individuals feeling frustrated with the process or
outcome, especially if the sentimental values predominate.
The best empirical approach thus far to understanding sentimental
value is the literature on the endowment effect that we noted above.  En-
dowment effect is a term that is used to describe the phenomenon by
which individuals value what they have just come to possess more than
their expressed value for the item prior to the moment of possession.41
For example, individuals who earlier expressed a willingness to pay ten
dollars for an item might not be willing to sell it for less than, say, twelve
dollars within moments of it becoming theirs.  This literature shows clearly
that people’s perception of value is quite malleable, in this case apparently
due to the actual fact of ownership (that is, more so than any sentimental
value acquired by the fact of long possession).42
40. For a further discussion of eminent domain and other areas of law in
which sentimental value is important, see infra notes 118-216 and accompanying
text.
41. See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (defining and discussing
endowment effect); Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonrevers-
ible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277 (1989) (same).
42. While we use the endowment effect to illustrate the idea of sentimental
value, the endowment effect has been presented as a more perceptual and imme-
diate psychological process than is reflected in the development of emotional con-
nections with objects (like one’s home) that reflect a history of experiences with
that object over time.  However, both reflect the concept of a unique valuation of
an object that is not shared by others.
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It is difficult to quantify the endowment effect because it varies widely
across individuals and contexts.43  While this has led some to consider the
effect as an artifact of experimental procedures,44 many scholars have con-
cluded that such an effect exists.45  Indeed, humans are not the only spe-
cies that show this behavior, indicating that there has been selective
pressure to behave in this way across a number of species (or at least, a
number of primates).46  This indicates that this response is not a cultural
or experimental artifact, but an evolved response that affects our under-
standing of human behavior.47
43. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (2003) (noting that “the existence and extent of the endow-
ment effect is context-dependent”).
44. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A
New Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935 (2008) (proposing
“new” version of endowment effect); Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange
Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect
Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1462-63 (2007) [hereinafter Plott & Zeiler, Ex-
change Asymmetries] (challenging “interpretation of exchange asymmetries as pro-
viding empirical support for [ ] endowment effect theory”); Charles R. Plott &
Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Ef-
fect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM.
ECON. REV. 530, 544 (2005) (stating that “endowment effect theory and prospect
theory most likely do not explain” behavior in manner that advocates claim).
45. See Robert Franciosi et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect, 30 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 213, 226 (1996) (“Is the endowment effect an important
characteristic of behavior that should concern us?  As an observation contrary to
standard preference theory it cannot be lightly dismissed.”); John K. Horowitz &
Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Studies, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.
426 (2002) (basing its analysis in part on endowment effect dichotomies);
Kahneman et al., supra note 42, at 1325 (“[The] ‘endowment effect’ persists even
in market settings with opportunities to learn.”); Serdar Sayman & Ays¸e O¨ncu¨ler,
Effects of Study Design Characteristics on the WTA-WTP Disparity: A Meta Analytical
Framework, 26 J. ECON. PSYCH. 289, 297 (2005) (“One explanation for the disparity
is the endowment effect, which is a manifestation of the loss aversion property of
the Prospect Theory.”).  As indicated above, the OMB and others have begun to
incorporate the endowment effect into their policies. See supra notes 7-9 and ac-
companying text.
46. See Sarah F. Brosnan et al., Endowment Effects in Chimpanzees, 17 CURRENT
BIOLOGY 1704, 1704 (2007) (“We show the first evidence that chimpanzees do ex-
hibit an endowment effect . . . .”); Venkat Lakshminaryanan et al., Endowment Effect
in Capuchin Monkeys, 363 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 3837, 3837 (2008)
(“[C]ommon evolutionary ancestry shared by humans and capuchins may account
for the occurrence of the endowment effect in both species.”); T.E. Flemming et
al., Endowment Effects in Orangutans, ANIMAL COGNITION (forthcoming).
47. For a further discussion of the endowment effect as an evolutionary re-
sponse, see Jones & Brosnan, supra note 44, at 1936 (“[T]he endowment effect is
an evolved propensity of humans and . . . the degree to which an item is evolution-
arily relevant will affect the strength of the endowment effect.”).  Evolutionary sim-
ilarity can emerge through several processes, chief among them being homology
and convergence.  Homology describes the situation in which two species share a
common trait through a common ancestor, while convergence describes the situa-
tion in which two species come to share a trait through common selective pres-
sures, but not common origin.  These can be difficult to distinguish; although very
closely related species likely share many traits through homology, convergence is a
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Further, studies have shown that endowment effects appear in con-
texts in which objects in one’s possession are useful, for instance keeping
an item in one’s possession when it is valuable, but not keeping the object
when it would not be useful.  This further highlights the importance of
object value and salience to understanding these effects.48  It may be that
possession in and of itself—when the object is worth possessing—is so val-
uable that, evolutionarily, it was always better to hang on to an object than
to risk losing both it and the item that may be acquired in exchange, un-
less the potential gains from the new object were, on average, sufficiently
high to outweigh the cost of loss of both.49  For instance, in trades or
barters, the risk of getting nothing in return may have outweighed the
potential benefit from obtaining a more preferred item.50  This is not to
possibility as well.  On the flip side, so-called deep homology can exist between
extremely phylogenetically distant species, which may be difficult to detect.  For
the purposes of the current argument, whether these similarities are due to homol-
ogy (behavior shared by a common ancestor to these primates) or convergence
(similar selective pressures) is not important.  What is relevant is that this behavior
emerged in more than one species and operates in what appears to be very similar
circumstances. See, e.g., MARK RIDLEY, EVOLUTION (3d ed. 2004); Catherine F. Tal-
bot et al., Squirrel Monkeys’ Response to Inequitable Outcomes Indicates a Behavioral Con-
vergence Within the Primates, 7 BIOLOGY LETTERS 680 (2011).
48. See, e.g., Sarah F. Brosnan et al., Evolution and the Expression of Biases: Situa-
tional Value Changes the Endowment Effect in Chimpanzees, 33 EVOLUTION & HUM.
BEHAV. (forthcoming 2012).  In this study, subjects had access to two tools; each
tool could be used to achieve one of the two food items, but not the other (e.g.,
honey dipping and juice sponging), nor was either tool useful when the corre-
sponding food was not available.  The subjects’ endowment effects for the pair of
tools were tested for the same pair of tools in three different contexts: when both
foods were available; when both foods were visible, but not accessible; or when
both foods were absent.  Chimpanzees showed endowment effects for the tools
when foods were available, but not when foods were inaccessible or invisible.
49. Sarah F. Brosnan et al., Chimpanzee Autarky, 3 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2008),
available at http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.
0001518 (“[C]himpanzees do barter, relinquishing lower value items to obtain
higher value items (and not the reverse).  However, they do not trade in all benefi-
cial situations, maintaining possession of less preferred items when the relative
gains they stand to make are small.”); Sarah F. Brosnan, Property in Nonhuman Pri-
mates, 132 NEW DIRECTIONS IN CHILD & ADOLESCENT DEV. 9, 18 (2011); Sarah F.
Brosnan & Michael J. Beran, Trading Behavior Between Conspecifics in Chimpanzees,
Pan Troglodytes, 123 J. COMP. PSYCHOL. 181, 182 (2009) (“Again, chimpanzees only
traded for preferred foods and, as would be expected, rarely traded when foods
were close in value.”); Jones & Brosnan, supra note 44 (studying endowment effect
in chimpanzees).  The endowment effect is not arbitrarily inclusive; that is, you
might expect the possessor of our five-dollar coffee mug to refuse anything less
than seven dollars for the mug under typical circumstances, but to only refuse an
offer of one hundred dollars in extraordinary circumstances, say if the mug was a
final gift from a deceased relative.
50. See Brosnan et al., Chimpanzee Autarky, supra note 49, at 3 (“First, the risk of
defection discourages costly commodity barter.  When a chimpanzee hands an-
other individual a barter commodity, the second individual (let’s say ‘the seller’)
could defect and run away with both commodities.”); Brosnan & Beran, supra note
49, at 182 (“Not trading for closely valued items] potentially represents a trade-off
between the gains of trade on the one hand and the risks inherent in giving up an
item on the other.”); Brosnan, Property in Nonhuman Primates, supra note 49, at 18
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say that because a trait is widely shared it is more important or right; that
would be committing the naturalistic fallacy.51  On the other hand, the
widespread occurrence of the effect supports the view that the trait both
exists (e.g., beyond an experimental artifact) and has an evolutionary ori-
gin;52 it may also help to explain why it exists, and it may provide insight
into situations in which a trait is sufficiently deeply ingrained in a species’
biology that it will be challenging to change.53  Beyond the consensus view
that people and other species attach greater value to an item once they
possess it than to the same item when they do not have it in their posses-
sion, much remains to be learned about particular features of the endow-
ment effect, including why it exists and its resilience in different contexts.
While the endowment effect (the act of possession) has received the
majority of empirical attention, at least two other factors affect value: ac-
quired information about one’s possession,54 and the formation of an
emotional attachment to one’s possession.55  Closely related to the idea
that the act of possession affects value is that an object one possesses for an
extended period of time may gain additional value due to the very fact of
possession.  There is experimental support for the concept that a compo-
nent of the value of an item stems from value that accrues due to usage or
information acquisition.  This phenomenon, too, occurs among other spe-
cies, with individuals, for instance, fighting harder to maintain territories
that they possess than to gain territories that they would like to acquire.56
This is hypothesized to occur due to the additional, very real value that is
(“This behavior, similar to that seen in the endowment effect study discussed ear-
lier, indicates that chimpanzees are hesitant to give up an item in their possession,
possibly because of the risks of trade.”).
51. The naturalistic fallacy describes a situation in which a behavior is consid-
ered morally acceptable or in some other way permissible by the fact that other
species engage in the behavior.  In other words, the fact that the behavior occurs
in nature is somehow seen as a normative justification for said behavior.  For an
extreme example of this fallacy, consider rape, called forced copulation in the
animal literature.  This behavior occurs regularly in a variety of animals, including
orangutans, another great ape species closely related to humans.  Despite this prev-
alence, and hypotheses regarding the evolutionary function of the behavior, rape
in humans is neither acceptable nor necessarily a result of the same mechanisms
(e.g., in humans it may be about power rather than reproduction per se).
52. See Plott & Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries, supra note 44 (explaining experi-
mental nature of procedures leading to evidence of prospect theory).
53. See generally Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral
Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005) (discussing true impact of behavioral biol-
ogy on law); Jones & Brosnan, supra note 44 (arguing legal field could greatly
benefit from greater knowledge of behavioral biology).
54. See infra note 67 (recounting effect of one’s possession).
55. See infra note 67 (explaining that one’s possession leads to emotional at-
tachment). For an excellent review of the literature on how property, attitudes
about property, and self-identity interact, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, “To Be
Human”: A Psychological Perspective on Property Law, 83 TUL. L. REV. 609 (2009).
56. J.R. KREBS & N.B. DAVIES, AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIOURAL ECOLOGY
159-60 (3d ed. 1993) (summarizing principle that humans will fight harder to
maintain their possessions than to obtain those they wish to acquire).  For the
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acquired when an individual learns the details of one’s territory, e.g., the
location of good food sources or nesting sites or hiding spots from
predators.57  Modern Western humans may have similar emphases, as evi-
denced by the adverse possession doctrine.58  Thus, individuals very rea-
sonably value a thing that they possess more so than others who do not
possess it, possibly due to the benefits provided by additional knowledge of
the object.
Beyond this, humans also ascribe value due simply to the feelings,
memories, and emotions that exist for a possession, typically called senti-
mental value.59  Sentimental value is value that is inherently personal and
highly subjective.  An object may only acquire sentimental value for one or
a few individuals, and the presence of sentimental value for one individual
does not mean that the same object will have such value for anyone else,
although others may recognize this value.60  This sort of emotional attach-
ment may have particular salience in the case of homes, leading individu-
als to feel that it merits particular protection, including from
government.61  In scenario studies in which individuals are asked to specu-
late about how they would feel about various eminent domain decisions,
both the length of time during which a family has lived in a house and, to
a much lesser degree, the proposed purpose of the new use of the prop-
erty, affected perceptions of the entire interaction.62  It is unclear pre-
cisely how sentimental value as we describe it ties in to the endowment
effect.  The general consensus seems to be that the endowment effect de-
scribes a phenomenon that occurs far too rapidly to be due to information
acquisition, but is instead a predisposition to value what one possesses re-
gardless of other information.63  Thus it may be that these are additive;
humans may value what they own, and then increase the value once they
have learned information which makes that possession more useful or
have developed an emotional attachment.
original study, see John R. Krebs, Territorial Defense in the Great Tit (Parus Major): Do
Residents Always Win?, 11 BEHAV. ECOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 185 (1982).
57. See KREBS & DAVIES, supra note 56, at 159-60 (discussing value attributed to
territory).
58. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property “Instinct”, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1763, 1766-67 (2004) (explaining how evolution provides
insight into justifications for adverse possession).
59. See Anthony Hatzimoysis, Sentimental Value, 53 PHIL. Q. 373, 373 (2003)
(explaining notion of sentimental value as emotional attachment); Guy Fletcher,
Sentimental Value, 43 J. VALUE INQUIRY 55 (2009) (same).
60. See Hatzimoysis, supra note 59, at 374-75 (discussing personal nature of
sentimental value).
61. For initial studies, see Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
62. See Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 731-33 (showing individuals’ re-
fusal to sell at any price).
63. See Christopher Curran, The Endowment Effect, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 819 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (conflat-
ing these two approaches, seemingly).
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Together, these factors influence the value people attach to items,
and can be colloquially grouped under the heading of “sentimental
value.”  Regardless of the precise relationship between and among these
types of sentimental value, the key point for our purposes is that the litera-
ture in each of these areas supports the existence of such value beyond
what is often considered to be an item’s monetary value.  The question for
us in this Article is what effect the existence of sentimental value should
have on governance decision-making processes.  As indicated above, our
premise is that decision-making procedures should be structured so that
they are responsive to the interests of key stakeholders; thus, the nature of
a procedure needs to increase a person’s sense of the legitimacy of the
process (and of governance more generally) rather than diminish it.  Hav-
ing shown that there is good reason to believe that procedures that rely
exclusively on monetary fair market value as the sole measure of value
likely do not capture all of the interests people have, in at least some cir-
cumstances, the next question is whether there are ways to improve deci-
sion-making procedures so that they better align with a broader set of
people’s interests.  One way to consider this broader set of interests is in
terms of what remedies to provide to satisfy these interests.  However, we
argue that it is also important to address the issue of interests when consid-
ering how decisions surrounding these interests are made.
One seemingly straightforward strategy for capturing sentimental
value in decision-making is to require decision-makers to consider such
values.  However, even if one were inclined from a conceptual or theoreti-
cal perspective to incorporate subjective values into decision-making,
there are significant challenges to doing so effectively.  Two particular dif-
ficulties with value—both issues with respect to sentimental value—are
that, first, value is subjective, and second, value perception shifts within
the same individual across different contexts.  For instance, considering
the endowment effect, individuals value the same item differently depend-
ing on whether they do or do not own it, and this change takes place
rapidly, in the moment or two surrounding the acquisition of possession.64
In other words, an individual’s willingness to pay for an item becomes
smaller than the willingness to accept the monetarily equivalent offer for
that object, apparently at the instant at which ownership is acquired.
In short, sentimental value, defined broadly to include the endow-
ment effect, information acquisition, and traditional or popular notions of
sentimental value, may be very difficult to place a monetary amount on
due to differences in subjective perception, both across contexts (are you
the owner or the would-be purchaser) and within contexts (you may value
the home you grew up in more than I do).  The dynamic and ad hoc
character of value raises significant rule of law questions.65  An area of the
64. See Knetsch, supra note 41, 1282-83 (analyzing outcome of scientific stud-
ies of indifference curves).
65. For a further discussion of this phenomenon in the eminent domain
arena, see infra note 195-97.  One risk of too much ad hoc-ism is the possible un-
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law in which this issue of sentimental value is most pressing is in eminent
domain.  One of the features of eminent domain that leads to protests and
dissatisfaction is that the rulings of what qualifies as fair market value are
typically not considered such by the homeowner.66  This provides a chal-
lenge as it seems difficult to quantify sentimental value in any reasonable
or fair way.67  Several leading scholars have proposed a variety of strategies
to address this challenge of incorporating sentimental value into determi-
nation of a property’s worth for eminent domain purposes, but none has
gained traction.68  Given the inherent subjectivity, it remains unsettled
whether there are viable ways to ascribe importance to sentimental value
when making legal decisions, and if so, how we should go about doing
so.69
These challenges in practicability—in being able to easily assign senti-
mental values to objects—bring us back to the larger questions that are
the focus of this Article.  First, does the existence of sentimental in addi-
tion to monetary value affect peoples’ views about how well different deci-
sion-making processes will protect their interests?  The answer is yes.70
dermining of “rule of law.” See, e.g., Melissa M. Berry et al., Much Ado About Plurali-
ties: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony of Concurrences, and Re-percolation After
Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299, 309 (2008) (arguing that “[t]he essential
elements to a legal regime based on the rule of law involve: (1) clear and under-
standable rules; (2) predictability and certainty; (3) procedural validity in the for-
mation of rules; and (4) rules independent of individual whims of government
officials and instead with a basis in established law”).
66. For a further consideration of findings in the context of eminent domain,
see infra notes 121-217.
67. See infra notes 121-217.
68. See infra notes 121-217.
69. See infra notes 121-217.  There are other challenges to valuation as well
that are widely discussed and studied within the literature on the psychology of
justice.  Studies of perceived justice show that people’s self-interested motivations
shape their feelings of justice and entitlement.  People in settings in which their
perception of entitlement shapes what they will receive are motivated to give in to
such self-interested motivations and heighten their feelings of fair value.  For ex-
ample, the equity literature seeks to build employee morale by providing employ-
ees with what they view as a fair level of compensation.  This approach has not
been particularly successful and the reasons for that lack of success provide a cau-
tionary message for the situation being discussed here.  Studies find that people
generally exaggerate the value of their work efforts relative to the ratings of neu-
tral observers. See generally Mark R. Leary, Motivational and Emotional Aspects of The
Self, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 317 (2007). In order to give people what they view as
fair pay, therefore, managers need to pay them more than what a neutral assess-
ment suggests their work is worth.  As a consequence, a focus on giving people
what is needed for them to be satisfied with their “value” has negative management
implications. See TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997)
(studying social justice from social society perspective).  These challenges provide
further support for focusing on identifying acceptable procedures for determining
value.  We suggest, in keeping with the overall procedural justice literature, that
the procedure for determining value can help to create the motivation for ac-
cepting that value.
70. For a further discussion of our survey results, see infra notes 86-118 and
accompanying text.
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Second, if peoples’ views about how well a process protects their interests
vary based on whether they want a process to protect monetary versus sen-
timental value, which procedures do people find effective (and ineffec-
tual) for the latter?  The answer to this second question is that
referendums do best and judicial litigation was third best out of the five
processes we studied.71  Third, concerning judicial litigation in particular
(the process on which we focused), given that people did not think it was
particularly effective in protecting sentimental values, are there process
features that might enhance its perceived effectiveness?  In short, our
hope was to develop insights concerning whether existing procedures do
well (or not) in addressing sentimental value, why procedures do well (or
not), and, based on these insights, to advance understanding about op-
tions for revising procedures to increase satisfaction when sentimental val-
ues are important.
As is probably clear already, but we emphasize it here, our focus is not
on fair value per se (i.e., upon issues of distributive justice).  Instead, we
focus on another issue central to designing a legal system: creating proce-
dures that can authoritatively resolve disputes among people about value.
Our argument flows from the abundance of evidence that peoples’ willing-
ness to trust the law and the actions of legal authorities is linked to legiti-
macy.72  Moreover, legitimacy is created and maintained through making
decisions using procedures that people judge to be fair.73  Hence, in the
eminent domain arena, for example, if the government is to have the
power to take private property for just compensation, we are concerned
about the ability of the legal system to use fair procedures as a way of
establishing and legitimating a particular approach to a level of remunera-
tion when the government takes private property.  Our findings, and the
procedural justice literature more broadly, show that in important respects
it is the procedure for determining value that people trust to protect the
monetary and sentimental value of their property.
71. See infra notes 86-118 and accompanying text.
72. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (explaining
link between trust in law enforcement and legitimacy).
73. See generally id. (summarizing evidence linking legitimacy to belief in law
enforcement).
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III. OUR STUDY METHODOLOGY74
A. Our Sample
The questionnaire was posted on a website and interested parties
were invited to complete it.75  A number of groups were contacted and
shared information about the web link with their members and others
who receive their newsletters or are on their listservs.  Several leading or-
ganizations were very helpful and shared the questionnaire with their con-
stituents via listservs and other means.  These included: (1) the leading
organization in Florida for lawyers in the field, the Environmental Law
and Land Use Section of the Florida Bar;76 (2) the leading state associa-
tion for planners, the Florida Chapter of the American Planning Associa-
tion;77 (3) the state agency responsible for overseeing land use regulation
in Florida, the Department of Community Affairs, which sent the survey to
the eleven state regional planning councils;78 (4) the Florida League of
Cities, which represents the 400-plus cities in Florida;79 (5) the Florida
Home Builders Association, a leading trade group for developers;80 (6)
1000 Friends of Florida, a statewide organization with a significant focus
74. This summary of our study methodology in Parts III(A) and (B) is
excerpted from Tyler & Markell, supra note 10 at 549-51.  That article covered
different findings from the same study.  We have excerpted part of this
introduction here, although the details about the questionnaire differ because the
two articles focus on different issues and different questions. See id. at 550-54
(explaining methodology behind the study).
75. The authors will provide interested readers with a copy of the question-
naire.  Please e-mail any of the authors.
76. The Environmental Law and Land Use Section is comprised primarily of
attorneys, though it also has affiliate members in related disciplines.  The section
representative indicated that the listserv goes to approximately 1,200 people.  Al-
most all are ELUL section members.  Approximately 100 are affiliate members.
These individuals represent the gamut of interests in the land use arena.
77. See Tyler & Markell, supra note 10.  The listserv of the Florida APA, a non-
profit organization, includes a total of more than 3,000 individuals.  The Florida
APA notified its members via its October 30, 2008 monthly bulletin and also in-
cluded a notice concerning the survey in its quarterly publication, Florida Planning.
78. The Director of Intergovernmental and Public Affairs for the State De-
partment of Community Affairs (DCA) sent an e-mail to the eleven regional plan-
ning council executive directors on our behalf and we followed up with an
additional e-mail to the RPC Directors. See FLA. STAT § 20.18 (2008) (summarizing
DCA’s role as State of Florida’s land planning agency).
79. See E-mail from Rebecca O’Hara, Fla. League of Cities, to authors (Oct.
10, 2008) (on file with authors).  The council published the notice in its Datagram,
a newsletter sent to several hundred municipalities.
80. See E-mail from Doug Buck, Dir. of Gov’t Affairs, Fla. Home Builders, to
authors (Oct. 28, 2008) (on file with authors).  We asked all organization repre-
sentatives with whom we spoke to share with us the note they sent their members/
constituents and also to let us know how many people would likely receive the
notice.  The Florida Home Builders Director of Government Affairs indicated that
he was making it available to members who might wish to comment.
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on land use;81 and (7) Tallahassee-Leon County Citizens United for Re-
sponsible Growth, a local citizens’ organization interested in land use.82
Because the information was widely circulated it is not possible to calculate
a response rate.  A total of 228 people responded to the questionnaire.83
The survey measured standard demographics: age, gender, income,
education, and ethnicity.  The demographics of the sample suggest that a
range of stakeholders responded.  The sample was comprised of 7% from
ages 16 to 34; 11% from 35 to 44; 27% from 45 to 54; 39% from 55 to 64;
and 17% from 65 or over.  It was 45% female.  The income distribution
was 55% under $100,000 and 45% above it.  With respect to education,
16% had some college or less, 21% were college graduates, 27% had
master’s degrees; 8% PhDs; and 21% had professional degrees.  Finally,
87% were white.  As is clear, this was not a random sample of the general
population; instead, it was a sample of elites.84  As such it may not reflect
the views about law and government that would be found in a survey of the
entire community.
Respondents were asked about their familiarity with different proce-
dures in the context of making land use decisions.  Of those who com-
pleted the questions, 86% indicated personal experience with private
negotiations; 96% with public hearings; 67% with administrative litigation;
52% with judicial legal procedures; and 41% with public referendums.  As
a result, this sample of elites likely had a relatively good familiarity with the
processes we studied.
B. Our Methodology
1. A Survey of Land Use Decision-Making Procedures
Respondents were asked questions about various procedures at the
beginning of the survey.  The procedures were defined as follows.
Informal meetings to negotiate a resolution to conflicts.  It is sometimes
possible to have informal meetings with . . . interested parties to
81. See Tyler & Markell, supra note 10.  1000 Friends indicates its listserv in-
cludes about 1,200 individuals.
82. We asked several other groups to send out notice about the survey via
their listserv or otherwise, but our understanding is that they did not do so.
83. As noted, this sample is a self-selected set of elites who have a stake in land
use procedures.  It is not a random sample of the people in the community.  Our
goal is to demonstrate the value of this type of empirical research in an effort to
stimulate further studies using surveys to better understand how to manage con-
tentious legal issues.  We encourage those future researchers to use methods for
collecting data that are less open to self-selection criticisms as a way of validating
and extending the findings we report in this Article.  We also encourage the read-
ers of this Article to recognize the possible limits associated with using data col-
lected from self-selected elites.
84. We did not investigate whether elites are more or less likely to be involved
in eminent domain proceedings.  They may be more likely to have property, but
they may also be more likely to have the power and knowledge to fight off eminent
domain, or to live in neighborhoods that protect them.
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discuss possible land use changes.  Areas of possible conflict are
resolved informally among the various interested parties.
Public hearings—Local government officials.  Elected local officials
typically hold public hearings in considering whether to amend a
general comprehensive land use plan and in considering a rezon-
ing request.  These hearings allow people to present their views
orally and to submit relevant information in writing.  Decisions
are made based upon the views of elected officials about what is
best for the community.
Administrative hearings.  A person affected by a comprehensive
plan amendment decision may file a petition for an administra-
tive hearing convened by the State’s Division of Administrative
Hearings (DOAH).  Those who are affected may represent them-
selves or be represented by counsel and may offer evidence
through witnesses and cross-examine other witnesses.  Decisions
are made based upon the consistency of the proposed land use
with rules and regulations about land use.
Court challenge.  After a local government body makes a rezoning
or other development order decision, in some situations it is pos-
sible to go to circuit court to challenge the decision.  This chal-
lenge would argue that the decision is inconsistent with the
comprehensive plan or existing laws on zoning.  Decisions are
made based upon the consistency of the planned land use with
the comprehensive plan or existing laws on zoning.
Ballot referendum.  Before a land use change is approved in some
jurisdictions, the jurisdiction puts the issue on the local ballot
and allows the public to vote it up or down.  Decisions reflect the
desires of the majority of voters.85
2. Questionnaire
Respondents were then asked the same questions about each of the
five procedures outlined above.
a. Acceptability
People were asked about their willingness to accept the decisions
made using the procedure to measure the degree to which a procedure
was authoritative.  They were asked to agree or disagree with the following
assertion: “I would be willing to accept the results of this procedure.”  Re-
sponses were recorded on a six-point scale ranging from “strongly disa-
gree” to “strongly agree.”
85. There are many variations on each of these forms of dispute resolution.
This reality should be kept in mind in reviewing the results.  It is conceivable that
different variations of different types of procedures would engender different reac-
tions.  Our results are obviously based on the description that we provided in the
questionnaire of each type of procedure, which we have included in the text.
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b. Monetary Value
For each procedure respondents were asked to respond to two asser-
tions.  The assertions were: (1) “This procedure respects the monetary
value of the property involved” and (2) “This procedural adequately pro-
tects the monetary value of the property involved.”  Responses were re-
corded on a six-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly
agree.”
c. Sentimental Value
For each procedure, respondents were asked to respond to two asser-
tions.  The assertions were: (1) “This procedure respects the sentimental
value of the property involved” and (2) “This procedure adequately pro-
tects the sentimental value of the property involved.”  Responses were re-
corded on a six-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly
agree.”
IV. RESULTS
In this Part, we focus on survey results in three key areas: (1) respon-
dents’ views about the extent to which different procedures protect mone-
tary and sentimental value and are acceptable; (2) why respondents favor
particular procedures (or are apprehensive about them); and (3) the role
of exogenous factors, notably trust in government, in shaping preferences.
We then discuss some of the more significant ways in which, at least in our
view, these findings have promise for influencing process design—the im-
plications of these results.
A. What Did Respondents Think About Different Procedures?
Respondents were asked how much they felt that resolving land use
conflicts using various procedures protected monetary value and senti-
mental value.  To examine this question a combined index was used in
which each procedure was rated in terms of its ability to respect/protect
monetary or sentimental value.  The procedures considered were: judicial
litigation; administrative hearings; negotiations; public hearings; and pub-
lic referendum.
Among the procedures, respondents rated the courts first in terms of
respecting/protecting monetary value and third in terms of respecting/
protecting sentimental value (Table 1, below).  They were also asked
which forums produced outcomes that they would be willing to accept and
again, the courts were rated first.  This suggests that peoples’ willingness to
accept decisions is linked more to the protection of monetary value, not
sentimental value.  If protecting sentimental value were the key to accepta-
bility, people would presumably indicate the willingness to most readily
accept referendum outcomes since they rated referendums as most likely
to protect sentimental value.
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TABLE 1: HOW WELL CAN DIFFERENT PROCEDURES PROTECT MONETARY
AND SENTIMENTAL VALUE?86
Willingness to
Monetary value Sentimental value
accept decisions
Judicial litigation 4.07 (1.37) 3.86 (1.28) 2.92 (1.23)
Administrative hearings 3.59 (1.43)*** 3.69 (1.28)** 2.83 (1.21)
Negotiations 3.24 (1.37)*** 3.45 (1.15)*** 3.16 (1.18)^
Public hearings 3.20 (1.53)*** 3.27 (1.37)*** 2.70 (1.29)
Referendums 3.69 (1.81)* 3.01 (1.50)*** 3.47 (1.53)***
It is also possible to separately examine whether a procedure would
respect a particular value and whether it would provide protection for that
value.  Although in many senses these are similar, it is possible to respect
without fully protecting, or to protect without respecting.  Thus, we chose
to ask about each in case our respondents saw them differently.
Table 1a presents the results of such an analysis.  Given that the likeli-
hood of the courts respecting and protecting monetary value was highly
correlated (r = 0.81), as was the case with respecting and protecting senti-
mental value (r = 0.79), it is not surprising that the ability of particular
procedures to do both is very similar.  In the case of the courts, for exam-
ple, the courts were viewed as most able to respect and protect monetary
value, but not the most able to either respect or protect sentimental value.
Referendums were viewed as best able to achieve both of these ends in the
case of sentimental values.87
TABLE 1A: RESPECT VS. PROTECT.88
MONETARY VALUE SENTIMENTAL VALUE
Respect Protect Respect Protect
Judicial litigation 3.88 (1.34) 3.83 (1.37) 2.96 (1.33) 2.86 (1.28)
Administrative hearings 3.69 (1.40) 3.66 (1.29) 2.85 (1.29) 2.86 (1.25)
Negotiations 3.53 (1.26) 3.34 (1.24) 3.26 (1.29) 3.07 (1.22)
Public hearings 3.24 (1.50) 3.29 (1.41) 2.67 (1.43) 2.71 (1.32)
Referendums 3.13 (1.64) 2.86 (1.54) 3.61 (1.63) 3.31 (1.61)
86. Entries represent the means.  The number in parentheses is the standard
deviation.  The significance levels noted indicate whether ratings for other
procedures differ significantly from those for judicial adjudication.  ^p < 0.10; *p <
0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001).
87. It is important to note that we are talking about respondent perceptions.
It could well be that in reality, referendums would not produce compensation that
would reflect sentimental value.
88. Entries are the means.  Numbers in parentheses are the standard
deviation.
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B. What Shapes Respondents’ Views About Different Procedures, with a
Particular Focus on Judicial Litigation?
In addition to assessing whether our respondents had different per-
spectives about the capacity of different procedures to protect sentimental
and monetary value, we asked what it was about the perceived functioning
of the different procedures that influenced our respondents’ evaluations.
To do so, we contrasted the influence of the perceived control over out-
comes and the judgment that fair procedures were used to make deci-
sions.  In this section, we summarize our findings about what it was about
courts that shaped the respondents’ view that courts do not protect senti-
mental value.
The regression analysis shown in Table 2 indicates that people partic-
ularly associated courts’ use of fair, procedurally just procedures with the
protection of sentimental value, at least in comparison to protecting mon-
etary value, which was more equally balanced between having control over
the outcome and thinking that one might win versus viewing the proce-
dure as fair.89  In the case of sentimental value, the weight given to the
likelihood of winning was 0.24, while the weight given to procedural jus-
tice was 0.38.  The key finding is that when people were concerned about
protecting sentimental value they focused upon having a fair (procedur-
ally just) procedure for making decisions.
TABLE 2: WHAT FEATURES SHAPE THE VIEW THAT COURTS
PROTECT VALUE?90
Respect/protect Respect/protect
monetary value sentimental value
Likelihood of winning 0.29*** 0.24*
Procedural justice 0.35*** 0.38***
Adj. R.-sq. 35%*** 33%***
In our study, we sought to unpack this issue still further.  In particu-
lar, our questions sought to elicit information that would help us to under-
89. A regression is an analysis that considers the contribution of several fac-
tors to explain a dependent variable.  In the regression analysis shown in Table 2,
each column represents a regression analysis in which both likelihood of winning
and procedural justice are entered simultaneously into an equation to determine
how much the respondents believe the courts can respect/protect each type of
value.  The number in the final row (adjusted square of the multiple correlation
coefficient) indicates the total amount of variance in the dependent variable (re-
specting/protecting value) explained by both factors considered at one time.
Each entry in a particular column is the standardized regression coefficient (i.e.,
beta weight) reflecting the relative weight of each factor in predicting value judg-
ments.  The magnitude of these standardized scores can be compared (i.e., 0.4 is
twice the weight of 0.2).  The asterisks by each number represent its statistical
significance.
90. Entries are standardized regression coefficients.  *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p
< .001.
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stand which procedural features people most care about, if procedural
justice is important in the context of protecting sentimental value.  We
looked to the procedural justice literature for insights about the types of
procedural justice features that might be salient.91  While procedural jus-
tice is a product of voice, neutrality, treatment with respect, and trust in
authorities,92 researchers have recognized that these procedural elements
reflect two stages of judgment.  Voice, neutrality, and treatment with re-
spect are responses to things that authorities do.  Trust is an inference
about the character of the authorities.  As Tom R. Tyler and Yuen J. Huo
argue,93 trust can be a consequence of what authorities do.  This provides
a framework for understanding the results shown in Table 3.  In our re-
gression analysis for Table 3, the independent variables were the elements
defining the fairness of a procedure.  Our findings indicate that it is clear
that trusting the motives of the authorities is the key to feeling that they
will make decisions in ways that protect sentimental value.  In contrast,
neutrality is the key to protecting monetary value.
TABLE 3: WHICH PROCEDURAL JUSTICE FEATURES LEAD PEOPLE TO THINK
THAT THE COURTS WILL PROTECT VALUE?94
Respect/protect Respect/protect
monetary value sentimental value
Voice 0.03 0.08
Neutrality 0.32* −0.01
Trust −0.02 0.50***
Quality of treatment 0.28 0.03
Nonfairness issues
−0.04 0.00
(cost, delay)
Adj. R.-sq. 31%*** 33%***
Our next level of inquiry involved investigating the key process fea-
tures linked to trust.  In other words, if trust in the decision-maker is im-
portant, the question is what features of a procedure tend to create such
trust.  The results of a regression of the other procedural elements on
trust (Table 4) show that judges are trusted if they provide opportunities
for voice, make clear that their decisions are made neutrally, and show
respect for people and their rights.  As Table 3 reflects, this is distinct from
protecting monetary value.  When people see decisions being neutrally
made they feel that monetary value is being protected.
91. See generally TYLER, supra note 72.
92. See id.
93. See generally TYLER & HUO, supra note 19.
94. Entries are standardized regression coefficients.
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TABLE 4: WHY DO PEOPLE TRUST COURTROOM AUTHORITIES?95
Trust the motives and intentions
of judges
Voice 0.25***
Neutrality 0.34***
Quality of treatment 0.35***
Nonfairness issues (cost, delay) 0.04
Adj. R.-sq. 81%***
The results from Tables 3 and 4 can be combined into an overall
model that recognizes that voice, neutrality, and quality of treatment can
influence inferences of trust as well as shape views about value protection
directly.  Figure 1 shows the results of a path analysis that maps the rela-
tionship among these variables.  It indicates that protection of the mone-
tary value of property is a direct result of having a neutral procedure.
However, protection of sentimental value is more complex.  It is linked to
inferences of trustworthy character.  In turn, such character comes from
allowing voice, displaying neutrality, and being respectful.  Hence, there
are different antecedents of protecting monetary and sentimental value.
The findings of this study point to the complexity of judging.  On the
one hand, judges show their ability to protect monetary value by being
neutral and rule-based in their decision-making. Their behavior is rule-
based and consistent across people.  Our findings lend support for the
idea that it is this justice of procedure that helps to legitimate courts and
leads them to be acceptable as a mechanism for making decisions.
95. Entries are standardized regression coefficients.
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On the other hand, our findings point to trust in judges as crucial to
their ability to acceptably manage sentimental value.  People want to feel
that the authority they are dealing with is benevolent and caring.  That is,
the authorities listen to peoples’ needs and concerns, they consider those
needs and concerns when making decisions, and they are motivated to be
sympathetic toward and caring about the people who appear before them.
These latter concerns are especially important when sentimental value is
at issue.
Balancing the two objectives of neutrality and trustworthiness makes
judging a complex and nuanced activity.  The findings of this study sug-
gest that striking an appropriate balance depends upon the nature of the
problem before the court.  If monetary value is the key issue, judges
should emphasize neutrality.  If sentimental value matters, they should fo-
cus upon allowing voice, communicating concern and respect for litigants
and their stories, and displaying neutrality.
C. What Role Does Trust in Government Play in Shaping Views
About the Courts?
Our discussion in the previous section focused on process features
that influence peoples’ views about how well different procedures protect
peoples’ interests.  Among other issues, we discussed the issue of trust in
connection with the particular judges who try cases.96  In this section, we
expand our focus to assess the influence of exogenous factors on peoples’
perceptions about different decision-making procedures.  As indicated
above,97 we asked our survey participants about several exogenous factors
and learned that trust in government has a significant effect on views
about decision-making processes.  There is a significant literature on trust
in government, which reflects that legal and political authorities generally
have declining legitimacy in American society.98
We explored the question of trust at the governmental level by exam-
ining the role of trust in local government in shaping views about different
decision-making procedures.  Table 5 shows the relationship between trust
in government and judgments about whether the courts protect monetary
and sentimental value.  Interestingly, those who distrust government are
less likely to say that it protects either value: r = -0.19, (p < 0.05) for mone-
tary value; r = -0.21, (p < 0.01) for sentimental value.  In contrast to trust in
the courts, low trust in government leads to a greater belief that referen-
dums protect monetary value (r = 0.37, p < 0.001) as well as sentimental
value (r = 0.29, p < 0.001).  In other words, there is a positive correlation
between high levels of trust and protection of value: the higher the level of
96. For a further discussion of the factors that shape respondents views, see
supra Part IV(B).
97. For a further explanation of how monetary and sentimental values affect
property, see supra note 36-73.
98. See supra note 24-28.
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trust a person had in government, the more the person thought the courts
protect value.  On the other hand, those who had low levels of trust in
government thought referendums protect value more effectively.
As we discuss in more detail below, referendums represent govern-
ment-by-the-public and our findings suggest that people who distrust gov-
ernment trust the public to recognize and take account of sentimental
values attached to homes and land.  People believe that others in their
community will make decisions that take account of their values, while
judicial authorities will not.  This goes beyond sentimental values, people
also believe that fellow citizens are more likely to respect monetary values
than are judicial authorities.
TABLE 5: CORRELATION BETWEEN TRUST AND VIEWS ABOUT WHAT
PROCEDURES PROTECT VALUES.99
COURTS RESPECT REFERENDUMS RESPECT
& PROTECT & PROTECT
Monetary Sentimental Monetary Sentimental
value value value value
Trust in local
0.19* 0.21** −0.37*** −0.29***
government (H = high)
Trust in national
0.20** 0.28*** −0.13 −0.10
government (H = high)
These findings suggest that judicial procedures do not exist in a vac-
uum; they are part of government.  When people distrust government,
they are more distrustful of the courts and of judges.  Hence, judges need
to work especially hard to legitimize themselves, their proceedings, and
their decisions when dealing with a public that is skeptical of the govern-
ment in general.  That is especially true when sentimental values are
important.
While this study focuses upon local issues of land use and community
and state government, we can extrapolate from these findings to suggest
that trust in the federal government is relevant to the likely acceptability of
federal decisions.  Table 5 shows that the same pattern was observed in
terms of trust in local and federal governments.
D. Implications
What are the implications of our findings for policy makers and
others who are concerned about legitimacy?  These findings suggest that
there is benefit to expanding efforts to promote citizen satisfaction with
governmental decision-making procedures beyond outcome-based re-
99. Entries are the correlation coefficient.
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forms.100  That is, the search for procedures that will produce better dis-
tributive outcomes is important, but it should be complemented by a
search for procedures that, qua procedures, will engender higher levels of
stakeholder satisfaction.  This is particularly the case when sentimental val-
ues are salient since, according to our findings, stakeholders may place
higher value on process in such situations.101  In the eminent domain
arena that we discuss in Part V, for example, we argue that it is worthwhile
to consider reforms beyond outcome-based improvements such as more
effectively estimating the sentimental value associated with homes or land
in an effort to compensate people adequately.102  In particular, it is valua-
ble to focus upon identifying a procedure (and process features) that pro-
duces outcomes that people will accept and that they believe protect their
interests.103
A second set of implications involves the role of money as the default
in our results.  A core concept in economics is the idea of revealed prefer-
ences.  According to that idea, we understand what people prefer by look-
100. In considering this argument, it is important to recognize that when we
presented each procedure to respondents we also presented the decision rule that
would be involved.  For example, with a referendum respondents were told that
the views of a majority of voters would determine the outcome.  Since a decision
rule is part of a procedure, we view respondent choices as reflecting their reaction
to the totality of each type of procedure.
101. See supra note 69.
102. In some cases, procedural reforms may be a palliative or placebo.  This
should be kept in mind in determining an appropriate mix of procedural and
outcome-oriented reforms. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the
Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abor-
tion Rights, 43 Duke L.J. 703, 738-42 (1994) (discussing models of measuring behav-
ioral responses).
103. As we note elsewhere, public satisfaction is obviously not the only factor
process designers should consider.  For example, accuracy of outcome is another,
as is the notion that the legal process may help to promote (or impede) efficient
policies for fostering innovation and growth. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Rib-
stein, Legal Process and the Discovery of Better Policies for Fostering Innovation and
Growth, in KAUFFMAN TASK FORCE ON LAW, INNOVATION, AND GROWTH, RULES FOR
GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 463
(2011) (explaining that legal processes may encourage efficiency); see also Nadler
& Diamond, supra note 31, at 745 (noting that procedural justice tack is not neces-
sarily panacea).  Professors Nadler and Diamond state:
The Court in Kelo took notice of what it characterized as the full planning
and democratic consideration of the redevelopment plan that led to the
taking. . . .  Regardless of whether planning is a useful and legitimate
indicator of a genuine public purpose, researchers who study procedural
justice predict that public hearings and opportunities for diverse constitu-
encies to be heard might reduce feelings of dignitary harm.  We suspect
that while considerations of procedural justice might ameliorate the per-
ceived unfairness of eminent domain for some takings, long-term home
ownership may instill an entitlement and provoke an outrage that cannot
be avoided with even the most democratic decision-making process.  In
future research we plan to investigate the potential role of procedure in
influencing public reaction.
Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 745 (citation omitted).
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ing at the choices they make.  In the case of this Article, we are concerned
with choices not among outcomes but among possible procedures for
reaching outcomes.  When people were simply asked to pick a desirable
procedure they expressed the highest level of willingness to accept the
courts (Table 1).  Further, when asked which procedures protect mone-
tary value people also chose adjudication.  However, when asked which
procedures protect sentimental value people chose other procedures.
This suggests that the primary value people had in mind when they chose
the courts was protecting monetary value.104  These findings raise several
questions.  Why is peoples’ default to protect monetary values?  Is love al-
ways a second-hand emotion?  Following from our findings, if money is
typically the more important value, it will be important for processes to
highlight their neutrality, while giving somewhat secondary attention to
trust.  On the other hand, if there are situations in which the default is
typically reversed and sentimental values predominate, policy makers
might consider highlighting trust-creating features.  More research is
needed to help gauge the relative importance of monetary and other val-
ues in different situations since the relative salience of different values af-
fects the processes people think will best protect their interests and the
process features that are important to peoples’ satisfaction.
A third set of implications from our findings is the framework they
provide for identifying in advance situations that are likely to pose
problems for the legal system and for identifying process changes that
hold promise for ameliorating public dissatisfaction in such situations.105
Our findings suggest that people generally expect that they will prefer res-
olution by courts, but that the courts are less authoritative in particular
types of situations.  Although people generally express willingness to defer
to the decisions of judges and overall view adjudication as the most desira-
ble procedure to use in resolving conflicts, this study suggests that they are
less likely to apply these feelings to cases where sentimental value is a key
issue.  This study suggests that when sentimental issues are at stake people
focus on the character of the judge—i.e., whether they trust the person in
authority.  When monetary issues are at stake, individuals evaluate the neu-
trality of the decision-making rules.  Hence, the context changes how peo-
ple think about procedural fairness.  Since a key virtue of the court is its
neutral decision-making, the acceptability of the courts as a mechanism
for resolving disputes suffers when that is not the basis of their legitimacy.
104. One way to compare the role of these two judgments is to do a regres-
sion analysis looking at the influence of monetary and sentimental judgments
upon willingness to accept decisions made by the court.  When we do so we find
that monetary judgments (beta = 0.41, p < 0.001) dominate sentimental judgments
(beta = 0.24, p < 0.001) in an equation that explains 31% of the variance in willing-
ness to accept decisions.
105. While respondents are making a priori judgments, those judgments are
the same among respondents who have prior experiences resolving issues using
the courts.
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These findings suggest that, in addition to considering revising court
procedures so that judges are seen as acting fairly by displaying particular
elements of fairness when they conduct their proceedings (through fea-
tures that provide opportunities for voice, a showing of respect, and re-
flecting neutrality),106 it might be worthwhile to combine court litigation
(the most preferred process and one that does relatively well in protecting
monetary value) with processes that are stronger in protecting other val-
ues, such as a referendum process, which is perceived as much stronger in
protecting sentimental values.  Related, these findings help us to under-
stand the pull of referendums.  People like them because they leave au-
thority in the hands of the public and are a way to protect sentimental
value.  What would the world look like if people chose procedures based
upon the desire to protect sentimental value?  People would choose a ref-
erendum as a way to make decisions.107
Interestingly, the respondents do not view negotiation as similar to
referendums.  Those who do not trust government are not supportive of
resolving conflicts via negotiation.  In this respect, negotiation is similar to
the courts, both of which are distinct from referendums.  Why might this
be true?  Discussions of negotiation emphasize that private transactions
are responsive to market forces.  Hence, a negotiation is unlikely to be a
situation in which one party pays another more for their home due to
106. We are making these suggestions at a framework level.  We are not rec-
ommending specific procedures for providing voice or other features that our
findings suggest are important.  We note that the search for useful procedures at
an implementation level will be challenging.  Our findings that public hearings are
held in very low regard, for example, raise questions about voice of the sort pro-
vided in such hearings. See Tyler & Markell, supra note 10 (commenting on pub-
lic’s voice displayed in public hearings); supra note 86 and accompanying text
(displaying in Table 1 results about public hearings as conclusive).  Concerns
about the disconnect between lawyers and their clients, in terms of the interests
they hold and seek to validate through litigation, similarly raise questions about
the utility of allowing lawyers a voice as a strategy to give such voice to clients. See
Gillian K. Hadfield, In Framing the Choice Between Cash and Courthouse: Experiences
with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645, 645-49 (2008)
(recounting utility of validation through litigation); Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the
Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV.
701 (2007) (discussing theory that giving voice to lawyers gives voice to clients).
There is also a broader issue raised by these findings.  One reason that mone-
tary value is important is that claims are third-party funded with lawyers seeking
monetary damages to recover the resources they have used to support the litiga-
tion.  A focus on sentimental value, or on other things people might want in litiga-
tion such as an apology, may make the parties happy but lawyers are less likely to
be willing to facilitate litigation without the prospect of a tangible monetary
settlement.
107. There is a substantial literature on referendums, their advantages and
disadvantages. See Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1465, 1476-77 (2008).  Heller and Hills propose use of referenda as part of
their “land assembly districts” proposal for reducing the use of eminent domain
authority. See id. at 1491-92 (explaining proposal for referenda use).  Other than
briefly discussing how our findings might bolster the Heller and Hills proposal, we
do not delve into the referendum literature in this Article.
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sentimental attachment.  Consequently, the courts and negotiation are
alike in the sense that they are processes in which sentimental value is
likely to be unprotected.
Consider another example of market solutions in a community coop-
erating to manage a disputed resource: water use during a water
shortage.108  In this study, the respondents considered a variety of proce-
dures for allocating water.  The respondents rejected market solutions be-
cause they believed that water should be allocated by principles of need
while markets reflected the ability to pay.  Interestingly, the respondents
indicated that a market solution would be an effective way to allocate
water.  They rejected it on justice grounds.  Here, too, respondents were
indicating that a negotiated solution would not take account of issues be-
yond the ability to pay.  This is consistent with other findings suggesting
that people may be skeptical about market mechanisms of allocation
where they feel that justice issues are at stake.109
More generally, these findings suggest that there is a benefit from
expanding our focus beyond trying to effectively estimate and commodi-
tize the sentimental value attached with homes or land in an effort to com-
pensate people adequately to create satisfaction.  We argue that it is
important to focus upon identifying a procedure that produces outcomes
that people will accept as a way of resolving conflicts.110  And, as we note,
courts are generally recognized as such a procedure.  But, courts are not
always equally acceptable and our findings both identify a set of conditions
under which courts have problems being authoritative and propose a pro-
cedural remedy based upon: (1) judging following procedures that build
legitimacy and (2) using other procedures, such as referendums, which
are more responsive to sentimental value.
A key related issue posed by our findings concerns what the legal sys-
tem would look like in situations in which sentimental value is the ori-
enting principle guiding institutional design.  One clear suggestion is that
it would lead people to place power in the hands of the public rather than
experts.  In this respect, we see possible parallels between our findings and
the recent discussion of “death panels” in the debate on health care re-
108. See Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas:
Procedural Justice and Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J. OF PER-
SONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 482 (1995) (using water management as example of
community conservation of scare resources); Tom R. Tyler, Duties Under the Law, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DUTIES: PSYCHOLOGY’S CONTRIBUTIONS, THE LAW’S COMMEN-
TARY 137 (Norman J. Finkel & Fathali M. Moghaddam eds., 2005) (giving examples
of community conservation).
109. See generally Harris Sondak & Tom R. Tyler, How Does Procedural Justice
Shape the Desirability of Markets?, 28 J. OF ECON. PSYCHOL. 79 (2007) (arguing percep-
tions of justice may be impacted by market mechanisms like allocation).
110. This study looks at the willingness to put in place a procedure for resolv-
ing disputes before those disputes occur.  As such, it is really about governance.  A
separate question is why the parties to a dispute accept a resolution after it occurs.
There is a large literature suggesting that procedural justice is equally central to
post-decision acceptance.
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form.  What the public feared in that debate was giving power over deci-
sions about whether they or their family would live or die to
untrustworthy, uncaring experts who would essentially be neutral and fact-
based in their medical decisions.  In contrast, people themselves wanted
the power to take account of their feelings when making such decisions.
For example, they might want to try to save the life of a loved one by
spending money to supply an untested drug with no record of success.  An
insurance company, in contrast, would deny this use of money on factual
grounds, citing the lack of evidence that the drugs would work and were
therefore worth the expense.  To allow such sentimental values to be con-
sidered, the public wants a decision-making system in which the decision-
makers share their sentimental values and, in the case studied here, that is
a referendum.  A referendum places power in the hands of the people in
the community, not experts.
The ideal of a trust-maximizing process raises its own set of issues that
deserve attention.  A problem with a system based upon sentiment is that it
may lack the virtues of neutrality and factuality in which a decision-maker
applies general rules consistently and without partiality.  In a series of pro-
vocative studies, C. Daniel Batson demonstrated that people can allow
their sentimental feelings to override principles of right and wrong when
faced with choices involving sentiment.111  In one study, Batson asked peo-
ple to consider moving a cute, young child ahead of others in line for an
organ donation.  He determined that people are moved by their sympathy
for a likable victim to violate general rules of fairness and move that per-
son up beyond others who, according to neutral factual rules, are more
deserving of help.112  Hence, a legal system that gives weight to sympathy
is one that can potentially undermine the rules of a neutral fact-based allo-
cation system.  People are encouraged to compete on a playing field of
compassion, shaping their situation so as to tug upon emotional strings in
an effort to increase the empathy they can encourage in others.  Who is to
say how much losing a home in which one raised children is worth, but a
sympathetic picture of a grey-haired, elderly couple tending their family
garden is likely to elicit high evaluations.  Of course, people’s emotional
heartstrings are already tugged in courts, with lawyers making emotional
appeals to juries.  Such appeals are generally unsuccessful in courts and
juries are found to overwhelmingly rely upon a neutral evaluation of the
facts.113
Further, a system focused on sentimental values has the potential to
incentivize less-than-ideal behavior.  As we noted, in such a system people
are rewarded for allowing their self-interested motivation to exaggerate
their own desires and needs to run free.114  The stronger sense of exagger-
111. See C. Daniel Batson, Justice Motivation and Moral Motivation, in THE JUS-
TICE MOTIVE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 91 (Michael Ross & Dale T. Miller eds., 2002).
112. See id.
113. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986).
114. See Batson, supra note 111, at 91-93.
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ated entitlement people have, the more likely they are to receive.  This
point has been noted in studies of the role of need in social welfare deci-
sions.115  When allocations are based upon need, peoples’ motivation to
exaggerate their needs is encouraged.  A key issue then becomes recogniz-
ing true need.  Ironically, this leads to the need for a neutral factual deci-
sion-maker, such as a judge, who can sift through claims.  More generally,
these considerations highlight a central point of this Article: the difficulty
in making decisions based upon subjective valuations.  It is for this reason
that we emphasize the importance of having a procedure that people find
acceptable.  Of course, part of that procedure has to be a mechanism for
making valuations.  However, rather than focusing exclusively upon the
issue of valuations, we think that law reform efforts should also focus on
ensuring acceptable procedures through which this task can be
accomplished.
Our argument is for a contextually based balance.  We believe that
both neutrality and trust are important, with their balance depending
upon the nature of the values involved.  A process that is strong on senti-
mental values may be better in contexts where those values predominate,
while a process that is strong on monetary values may be better in contexts
where they predominate.  Thus, knowing one’s audience is critical to ef-
fective process design.  Related to this, it may improve process legitimacy
to combine elements of different procedures or to offer multiple mecha-
nisms for participation, or to revamp mechanisms to add features.  We also
believe that as trust in government declines it will be more and more im-
portant for authorities to build trust.  As our findings suggest, they can do
so by using the principles of procedural justice when conducting judicial
proceedings and when articulating reasons for their decisions, among
other possibilities.  At the same time, it is essential to maintain a reputa-
tion for neutrality and consistency.
A final implication involves the salience of exogenous factors to pro-
cess design. In recent discussions of civic discourse, public distrust of gov-
ernment has emerged as a key theme.116  Our findings reflect that this
issue is important in our discussion.  Our survey respondents who dis-
trusted government did not believe that the courts would protect their
values, sentimental or monetary.  They became interested in referen-
dums—a procedure they believed does protect those values.  It is also in-
teresting that when people distrusted government they did not distinguish
between monetary and sentimental value.  They thought that the courts
were less likely to protect either monetary or sentimental value.  This goes
beyond the prior argument that people distrust courts to protect senti-
mental value.  It suggests that when people distrust government they dis-
trust judges to protect their values overall.
115. See id.
116. See supra notes 22-29.
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E. Conclusions
People value items, including their property, in different ways.  Peo-
ple have a monetary interest in property, of course, but they may also at-
tach a sentimental value, broadly defined, as well.  Our study shows that, in
contexts related to disputes involving land use, people’s views about the
effectiveness of different types of decision-making processes in protecting
their interests change depending on the salience of these different types
of values.  Moreover, within this framework, different aspects of the proce-
dures (e.g., neutrality and trust) control respondents’ views.  To us, the
obvious conclusion that flows from this finding is that process design is a
very contextual task, assuming (as we do) that one goal in process design is
to leave both involved parties and other participants with the sense that
the process has been fair and has given due weight to the values they hold.
This seems essential for stakeholders to accept the legitimacy of deci-
sions.117  Our case study of the eminent domain realm in Part V illustrates
how policy makers and others interested in process design might internal-
ize this perspective as they consider how best to make decisions with pub-
lic consequences that will enjoy public support.118
V. CONSIDERING OUR FINDINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF EMINENT DOMAIN
The findings from our study are interesting in the abstract in high-
lighting the important role process may play in promoting good govern-
ance and enhancing legitimacy.  Our findings suggest: that peoples’ values
affect their process preferences; that, while judicial litigation fares well
when monetary values predominate, it does not fare well in protecting
sentimental values; and that bolstering trust through opportunities for
voice and respect is particularly important for people to be satisfied with a
process when sentimental values are salient.119  Our hope is that these
insights will contribute to an improved understanding of public percep-
117. Cf. JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY:
AMERICANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK (2002).
118. These findings suggest that particular attention needs to be paid to the
procedures through which federal government authorities make decisions when
those decisions concern issues in which sentimental values predominate, such as
social security and health care eligibility or homes and land.  Given the extreme
polarization that seems to have emerged in politics, it is important to examine the
degree to which the use of such procedures can transcend party loyalties, as well as
a general distrust of government.
119. For a further discussion of the survey results, see supra notes 86-118.  Pro-
fessor Relis discusses the “pervasive economic assumptions of the civil justice sys-
tem.”  Relis, supra note 106, at 708.  To the extent that this is true and remains so
and that peoples’ objectives are non-material, disaffection seems unavoidable.  To
the extent that the civil justice system continues to focus on economic issues, pro-
cedural refinements responding to other interests seem to hold promise for reduc-
ing dissatisfaction.  While we think this is a good thing in general, there are
downsides to focusing exclusively on process-oriented reforms. See supra note 102.
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tions of different types of process design, and ultimately to a use of proce-
dures that enjoy enhanced public acceptability.
In this Part, we consider these findings in a real world dispute resolu-
tion context to which people often bring a range of non-monetary values,
notably the exercise of eminent domain authority.  In common parlance,
an eminent domain proceeding entails the government’s providing “fair”
or “just” compensation as the quid pro quo for taking ownership of some-
one’s property.120  The Fifth Amendment, which prohibits takings of pri-
vate property for public use without just compensation,121 provides the
legal framework for the exercise of eminent domain authority.  A wide
range of prominent scholars have recognized that the exercise of eminent
domain authority implicates both monetary and non-monetary values, and
the courts have done so as well.122
The reality is that the public has not enthusiastically embraced, or
even calmly acquiesced in, the government’s use of eminent domain au-
thority in many cases.  The scholarly commentary is replete with refer-
ences to the enormous controversy eminent domain has engendered
despite its incorporation of just compensation as a core feature.  Professor
Ilya Somin notes that the Kelo v. City of New London123 decision, a case in
which the Court signaled its acceptance of widespread use of eminent do-
main authority,124 “was greeted with widespread outrage that cut across
partisan, ideological, racial, and gender lines.”125  Professor Nicole Stelle
Garnett observed that Kelo set off a “firestorm of popular outrage.”126  The
120. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
121. See id. (providing that “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation”).  The Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
122. For a recent effort to unpack these non-monetary values, see Nadler &
Diamond, supra note 31, at 725 (reporting on experiment that focused on nature
of values at issue in eminent domain setting and setting forth research on impacts
of “degree of attachment” to property involved and perceived legitimacy of pur-
poses for which land is being taken).
123. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  In Kelo, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, up-
held a condemnation of ten residences and five other properties as part of a “de-
velopment plan” in New London, Connecticut. Id. at 475, 489.  The Court gave
broad deference to “legislative judgments” on the meaning of “public use.” Id. at
480-81.  The Court noted that courts should not “second-guess the City’s consid-
ered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan.” Id. at 488.
124. See Garnett, supra note 31, at 103 (noting that Court ruled that “the pub-
lic use limitation . . . rarely prevents the government from taking property by emi-
nent domain and transferring it to a private beneficiary”).
125. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2108 (2009).
126. Garnett, supra note 31, at 103.  Professors Somin and Garnett are by no
means alone in their characterization of the response to Kelo. See, e.g., The Kelo
Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property—Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 106, 106 (2005) (testimony of Thomas W.
Merrill, Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia University School of
Law) (suggesting that Kelo “is unique in modern annals of law in terms of the
negative response it has evoked”); Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 714 (not-
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-2\VLR201.txt unknown Seq: 35  6-AUG-12 12:12
2012] WHAT HAS LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT? 243
ABA Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law review of condemna-
tion law suggests that most Americans “were aghast” about the condemna-
tion that the Supreme Court upheld in Kelo: “[t]he backlash . . . was
unprecedented” and the public was “outraged.”127
At first glance, at least, there are reasons to wonder why eminent do-
main has triggered such public outrage.  In a sense, eminent domain is the
flip side of regulatory takings law and, when viewed through that lens,
seemingly has some advantages for the party whose property rights are
being uprooted.128  In the regulatory takings context, the government
may, as a practical matter, dramatically curtail an individual’s ability to
enjoy his property while hoping not to pay for the privilege.129  The govern-
ment pays up, reluctantly, when a court directs it to do so (or when the
threat of such provides sufficient motivation).  In contrast, in the eminent
domain arena the government is not seeking to avoid compensating the
landowners.  Instead, the government is offering to make the landowners
economically whole.130  The government is not taking something for
nothing nor seeking to do so.  From a landowner’s perspective, in short,
being on the receiving end of an eminent domain action might in some
cases be preferable to having one’s property rights limited through
regulation.
Further, in many circumstances critical public policy objectives (e.g.,
providing essential infrastructure such as roads, sewer systems, utilities, or
ing that Kelo is “[o]ne of the most controversial U.S. Supreme Court cases of the
past several years”).
127. See Michael Rikon, Bulldozers at Your Doorstep: The Debris of Kelo v. City of
New London, in CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW: TAKINGS, COMPENSATION, AND BEN-
EFITS 1, 6 (Alan T. Ackerman & Darius W. Dynkowski eds., 2d ed. 2006); see also
Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 720 (noting that decision prompted “wide-
spread dismay”—disapproval of decision was “around 80%-90%”); Daniel R.
Mandelker, Commentary, Kelo’s Lessons for Urban Redevelopment: History Forgotten, 88
WASH. U. L. REV. COMMENTARIES (Nov. 24, 2008), http://lawreview.wustl.edu/com-
mentaries/kelos-lessons-for-urban-redevelopment-history-forgotten/ (noting that
“[n]o Supreme Court case created more backlash than Kelo v. City of New London”).
128. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61,
70-72 (1986) (discussing relationship between police power and exercise of emi-
nent domain authority and noting that “[l]egitimately exercised, the police power
requires no compensation”).
129. There are, of course, arguments that in many cases government regula-
tion that impinges on property rights benefits the property owner.  While there are
different branches of regulatory takings law, regardless of the branch involved, a
central claim raised by opponents of the government’s action is that the govern-
ment body involved needs to pay affected parties for diminishing the value of their
property.  The government’s posture in such cases often is that no compensation is
required. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-40 (2005);
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).  It is not our purpose in
this Article to address the appropriateness of takings law and we leave such issues
aside.
130. We offer this proposition with the qualifications discussed infra.  For a
further discussion of whether compensation is appropriate, see Heller & Hills,
supra note 107, at 1476-77.
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community resources such as hospitals) cannot be accomplished without
the government’s intervening in private property rights.131  Undoubtedly
because of this reality, virtually every contemporary government includes
in its toolbox the power to take private property for public purposes.132
Finally, there should be a degree of public acceptance of the use of
eminent domain authority since, in theory, a government should only ex-
ercise it when the social utility of transferring the property exceeds the
social utility of not doing so.  As Professors Janice Nadler and Shari Seid-
man Diamond put it:
From one economic perspective, government takings of private
property are theoretically unproblematic because the owner is
entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.  The
assumption is that government will only force the sale of property
if the benefit is higher than the cost of compensating the owner.
Thus, if the owner is fully compensated and the public is left bet-
ter off, there will always be an overall social improvement result-
ing from a taking.133
131. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (conclud-
ing that eminent domain can be indispensable when depressed economic condi-
tions exist and progress in addressing them is jeopardized by handful of property
owners); Garnett, supra note 31, at 138 (“The primary objection to substantive lim-
its on the eminent domain power is that holdouts may impede socially beneficial
projects.”).
132. David L. Callies, Phoenix Rising: The Rebirth of Public Use, in EMINENT DO-
MAIN USE AND ABUSE: Kelo in Context 49, 65-66 (Dwight H. Merriam & Mary Mas-
saron Ross eds., 2006).
133. See Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 714; cf. Heller & Hills, supra
note 107 (discussing situations in which eminent domain may lead to inefficient
results that do not maximize welfare and suggesting use of “land assembly districts”
to minimize holdouts).  As Professor Nicole Garnett and others have pointed out,
determining whether a project is efficient “is difficult at best” and “would-be bene-
ficiaries . . . have a substantial incentive to engage in rent-seeking” because emi-
nent domain may reduce transaction costs and generate a substantial economic
surplus that beneficiaries need not share.  Garnett, supra note 31, at 139.  Local
governments may have an incentive to respond favorably to such rent-seeking as
well, adding to the argument for monitoring the scope of eminent domain and not
“over-using” it.  Professor Garnett also makes the point that government may favor
overinvestment in some projects and they overestimate the benefits of condemn-
ing property. See id. at 140.  This is a reason to be cautious about increasing com-
pensation since such increases may not deter governments and put the public fisc
at greater risk. See id. at 140-41. In Kelo, for example, the New London Develop-
ment Corporation planned to lease the condemned property to a private devel-
oper for one dollar per year for ninety-nine years. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476 n.4.
Further, in some cases the “takers” are spending other governments’ money,
so the takers have little incentive to behave rationally economically.  The Poletown
project, in which the City of Detroit was receiving non-fungible financing (it was
available only for this project) almost entirely from federal and state governments,
is an example. See William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown:
How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV.
929, 943-44 (“Most of the financing for the Poletown project, however, came from
the United States government. . . .  Thus, the voters and elected officials in Detroit
had little financial interest in determining whether the Poletown project made
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-2\VLR201.txt unknown Seq: 37  6-AUG-12 12:12
2012] WHAT HAS LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT? 245
What accounts for the “unprecedented” and “outraged” public back-
lash that the exercise of eminent domain authority has nevertheless en-
gendered?  Scholars and others have offered several explanations.  First,
there is what Professor Garnett and others have referred to as “dignitary
harms.”134  For example, people are suspicious that the government is
playing favorites and advantaging some private parties at the expense of
others.135  In Kelo, many critics believed that the government was giving a
break to a powerful actor.136  Some scholars have suggested that this parti-
ality can cause resentment.137  To some extent related, owners may feel
that they are being required to give up something of importance even
though they will not share any benefits of the new use, because the own-
ers’ displacement makes it unlikely they will enjoy the benefits of the pro-
ject.138  Further, Professor Garnett suggests “[o]wners may feel unsettled
and vulnerable when they learn that the government plans to take their
property.  Eminent domain . . . eviscerates the physical autonomy” inher-
ent in ownership of private property and it deprives an owner of the
economic sense.”); see also Garnett, supra note 31, at 141-42 (noting that Kelo, in
which state funds were significant part of financing, is another example and that
eminent domain would become “much less attractive economic development tool”
if local governments internalized cost of their takings).
134. See Garnett, supra note 31, at 109-11 (referring to emotional reactions
stemming from condemnations that depart from traditional public uses as “digni-
tary harms”).
135. See id. at 145 (characterizing this favoritism as “expressive harm,” as
owner may perceive taking as insult).  The ultimate use involved obviously affects
the existence and extent of this type of dignitary harm.  In their study, Professors
Nadler and Diamond hypothesized that it mattered to people whether their prop-
erty was being taken for an archetypal public use like a school or hospital rather
than for a use that benefits private parties.  Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at
726.
136. See Rikon, supra note 127, at 6 (“The beneficiaries [of the decision] are
likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power . . . .”).  The
focus of much of this criticism has been that the government has inappropriately
expanded the concept of “public use” and that existing procedures, including judi-
cial review, do not provide adequate constraints. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros,
Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 295-97 (2006) (noting sur-
prise that Court in Kelo did not take opportunity to consider applying higher scru-
tiny in eminent domain cases involving taking of homes); Somin, supra note 125, at
2101 (“Kelo’s holding that the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment allows
the taking of private property for transfer to new private owners for the purpose of
promoting ‘economic development’ was denounced . . . .”).  However, there also is
evidence that the plaintiffs were “holdins”: they simply wanted to sit in their homes
because of their strong, subjective attachment to the property. See Nadler & Dia-
mond, supra note 31, at 721.
137. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547,
579 (2001) (“While people can view windfalls that befall another with sanguinity,
when the windfall arrives as a result of a strategic and deliberate decision of the
government, the reaction may turn to resentment and frustration.”).
138. See Garnett, supra note 31, at 145 (noting that when individuals are dis-
placed, their displacement makes it unlikely they will be able to enjoy benefits of
prosperity promised by economic redevelopment projects).
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“‘most essential right’ to exclude others.”139  In short, “the nature of the
government’s action” provides several grounds as to why its exercise of
eminent domain authority may be of concern to citizens.140
Second, concerns about the fairness of eminent domain may be am-
plified because eminent domain disturbs peoples’ “subjective attachment”
to their property, especially homes.  There is a growing literature on the
special status of homes in American culture and the “sentimental value”
people attach to them.  The concept of “ ‘[h]ome’ evokes thoughts of . . .
family, safety, privacy, and community.”141  The common-law adage that “a
man’s home is his castle” captures the cultural attachment to homes; Pro-
fessor D. Benjamin Barros suggests that the “psychology of home” has
roots beginning in the Middle Ages.142  He also suggests that because
homes are “sources of feelings of rootedness, continuity, stability, perma-
nence, and connection to larger social networks, . . . dislocation from a
home can have a strong, negative psychological impact on many peo-
ple.”143  Feelings of loss may be particularly significant or severe when the
move is involuntary.144  Some scholars have argued that retaining posses-
sion of a home represents a particularly important value that deserves em-
bodiment in the law.  Margaret Jane Radin’s “personhood theory,” for
example, urges that possession of homes deserves priority against compet-
ing interests because of the personal connection people form to their
homes.145  Lending empirical support for the idea that people often at-
139. Id. at 109-11.  Justice O’Connor’s comment in her dissent in Kelo cap-
tures this concern over the decision’s impact the nicely: “The specter of condem-
nation hangs over all property.  Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any
Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a
factory.”  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
140. See Garnett, supra note 31, at 109-11 (explaining that individuals whose
property is taken may suffer more from nature of government’s action than actual
subjective attachment to property).
141. Barros, supra note 136, at 259-60.  Barros points to special constitutional
protections for homes, special tax treatment, and special protections under
debtor-creditor law and landlord-tenant law. See id. at 259-63.
142. See id. at 270 (“The modern home owes its physical form to the emer-
gence of the bourgeois class in the Middle Ages.”).
143. Id. at 277; see also id. at 277-80 (discussing Radin’s thesis and arguing
Radin overstates personal connection people have to homes).  Barros also points
out that different people relate to homes differently and in some cases people may
not suffer from dislocation. Id. at 279-80.  For a further discussion of Professor
Radin’s views, see Radin, supra note 61.
144. See id. at 281 (“This feeling of loss is greater when the move is not volun-
tary because the sense of dislocation is more severe and the positive factors that
lead to a voluntary move are absent.”); Radin, supra note 61.
145. See Barros, supra note 136, at 257 (noting that “the pervasiveness of the
special treatment of homes . . . suggests the existence of a strong cultural consen-
sus that homes are uniquely important when issues of security, liberty, and privacy
are at stake”); Radin, supra note 61, at 1005-06, 1014-15 (explaining that if per-
sonhood was expressed in law, one would expect special treatment of things like
family homes).
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tach subjective value to property, in their experiments Professors Nadler
and Diamond found that “it is clear that a significant portion of the par-
ticipants [in their experiments] did view the land as possessing substantial
additional subjective value.”146
In a wide range of areas of the law, our legal system tailors its treat-
ment of homes to the special affinity we attach to them.  In other words,
we give special legal status to homes in a broad spectrum of settings.147
Thus, to name a few, constitutional protections against searches have spe-
cial salience when a search involves a home,148 the tax code affords special
treatment of homes in order to encourage home ownership,149 and post-
foreclosure laws protect possession of a home.150  Courts in divorce cases
have recognized the sui generis nature of homes, in some cases making it
clear that they want the custodial parent to retain the home to minimize
the disruption the divorce causes to children.  As one court put it:
The value of a family home to its occupants cannot be measured
solely by its value in the marketplace.  The longer the occupancy,
the more important these noneconomic factors become and the
more traumatic and disruptive a move to a new environment is to
children whose roots have become firmly entwined in the school
and social milieu of their neighborhood.151
Professor Barros concludes that “the pervasiveness of the special treatment
of homes in [multiple areas of law] suggests the existence of a strong cul-
tural consensus that homes are uniquely important.”152  In short, the sub-
jective value that people attach to homes may be another reason for the
outrage that the governments’ exercise of its eminent domain authority
146. Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 731; see also Gideon Parchomovsky
& Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and Econom-
ics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 77 (2004) (noting that property may be worth more or less
because of sense of community and that property should not be viewed
atavistically).
147. See generally Barros, supra note 136 (providing in-depth coverage of situa-
tions in which homes are treated differently (and more favorably) than other
property).
148. See id. at 263-69 (pointing to special constitutional protections for
homes, special tax treatment, and special protections under debtor-creditor law
and landlord-tenant law).
149. See id. at 304 (“A focus on home ownership and citizenship is reflected in
the favorable treatment given to homes in the Internal Revenue Code, most nota-
bly by the deduction allowed for interest on home mortgages and by the large
exemption given to capital gains realized on the sale of homes.”).
150. See id. at 283 (“All states recognize the debtor’s right to purchase the
home prior to foreclosure and many states have redemption statutes that allow the
homeowner to buy the home back from the foreclosure-sale buyer within a period
of time after the foreclosure sale is completed.”).
151. In re Marriage of Duke, 161 Cal. Rptr. 444, 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); see
also Barros, supra note 136, at 292-95.
152. See Barros, supra note 136, at 257.
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sometimes occasions, particularly when a government uses its authority to
uproot inhabitants from their home.
A third commonly invoked explanation for disaffection with the use
of eminent domain authority is the limited amount of compensation paid.
In eminent domain cases, fair market value is typically the benchmark or
measure used to determine the amount of compensation paid to the
owner.153  Fair market value may undercompensate owners for several rea-
sons, as many scholars have emphasized.154  First, fair market value may
not include relocation costs, goodwill (for businesses), or various displace-
ment costs, such as the unavailability of comparable housing.155  In addi-
tion, the “inability to say no” prevents an owner from enjoying the ability
to hold out if the owner thinks that the property may increase in value in
the future and this expectation affects the owner’s valuation of the prop-
erty.  Under a property rule, owners would have the ability to insist on
negotiating this expectation into the purchase price and to reject a deal if
the terms did not do so.156  Fair market value also excludes compensation
for dignitary harms.157  In addition, fair market value typically does not
include more sentimental factors that lead owners to attach value to a
home that differs considerably from the market price.  As Professors Nad-
ler and Diamond and many others have pointed out, “[i]n many instances
. . . the value of the property to the owner, or the subjective value, might
exceed—and in some cases, greatly exceed—the fair market value of the
153. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.310 (West 2012) (“Compensation shall
be awarded for the property taken.  The measure of this compensation is the fair
market value of the property taken.”); FLA. STAT. § 73.071 (2012); Coniston Corp.
v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (“‘[J]ust
compensation’ has been held to be satisfied by payment of market value.”).  The
IRS defines fair market value as “the price that property would sell for on the open
market.  It is the price that would be agreed on between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, with neither being required to act, and both having reasonable
knowledge of the relevant facts.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREA-
SURY, PUBLICATION 561, DETERMINING THE VALUE OF DONATED PROPERTY 2 (2007),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p561.pdf. But see Garnett, supra note
31, at 103, 121-28, 130, 143-48 (noting that fair market value is what is required but
in at least some cases payments exceed fair market value).
154. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 133, at 932 (noting that “[m]uch ink has
been spilled in articles pointing out that eminent domain practices fall short of
‘just compensation’”); Garnett, supra note 31, at 106-07 (noting that compensation
awards “can fail to indemnify owners fully”); Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at
724 (noting that “compensation for a taking pegged to fair market value almost
inevitably will undercompensate the owner of the property”); Parchomovsky & Sie-
gelman, supra note 146, at 84 (noting that fair market value may lead to “gross
undercompensation”);
155. See Garnett, supra note 31, at 106-07 (discussing how “[a] fair market
value award does not compensate an owner for relocation expenses, goodwill asso-
ciated with a business’s location, or the cost of replacing the condemned
property”).
156. See id. at 107 (“Property rule protection provides complete protection
against undercompensation in the normal market setting by enabling owners to
hold out for their reservation price.”).
157. See id. at 101 (explaining problems with fair market valuation).
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property.”158  Or as they put it more pithily, “[a]lthough market pricing
sees real property as fungible, people do not always share that view.”159
Nadler and Diamond offer a series of reasons why a property owner might
attach to a home subjective value that exceeds the fair market value,
including:
the improvements they have made over the years using their own
labor and design ideas; the memories inexorably connected with
the property, including milestones like births, birthdays, and
weddings, along with mundane but no less important memories
of everyday living; proximity to friends and family; connections
with others in the neighborhood that leverage social capital; ex-
pression of personality; and the ability of a home to provide the
opportunity to maintain and express personal and group
identity.160
In sum, law in the eminent domain arena not only does not “protect
possession of a home”161 because it inherently rejects a property rule ap-
proach, its liability rule underpinnings sometimes enables governments to
undercompensate the owner by paying only fair market value when requir-
ing the owner to give up his property.162  The valuation of property taken
by eminent domain is “problematic” because it fails to address subjective
value, dignitary harms, and other values.163
158. Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 715; accord Merrill, supra note 128,
at 84 (advocating that courts should be hesitant to condemn property when
owner’s subjective losses are high).
159. See Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 747 (explaining that homes are
particularly likely to attract subjective value).
160. Id. at 721 (citations omitted).  For a discussion of the impact of commu-
nity on property values, see Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 146.  Some of
the variables that commentators have suggested increase sentimental value include
its use as a residence and the length of time of ownership. See, e.g., John Fee,
Reforming Eminent Domain, in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: Kelo in Context,
supra note 132, at 125, 133 (“It is common for many people, particularly those who
have lived in their home for many years, to value their own homes at significantly
more than assessed market value.”).
161. As indicated, eminent domain turns on its head the property rule con-
cept that a person has autonomy to make decisions concerning ownership and
possession of a home. See supra note 68.  In upholding a broad definition of public
use in Kelo, the Court made it clear that states have the flexibility to impose more
stringent limits on public use than required by the Fifth Amendment.  Kelo v. City
of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482-83 (2005).
162. Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 724 (noting that “compensation for
a taking pegged to fair market value almost inevitably will undercompensate the
owner of the property,” citing several leading scholars); see also Kirby Forest Indus.
v. United States., 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (holding that just compensation typically
means fair market value of property).
163. See Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 723 (noting that valuation is
problematic because it tends to set compensation at fair market value, which does
not consider subjective value and dignitary harms). But see Garnett, supra note 31,
105, 121-26 (suggesting that “the risk of undercompensation has been overstated,”
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In fact, courts in eminent domain cases have recognized that fair mar-
ket value does not fully compensate an owner in many cases because of the
owner’s sentimental values.  Judge Posner, for example, notes that
“[c]ompensation in the constitutional sense is therefore not full compen-
sation, for market value is not the value that every owner of property at-
taches to his property but merely the value that the marginal owner
attaches to his property.”164  Even as it has upheld the market value stan-
dard, the Supreme Court has recognized that this standard fails to provide
full compensation to the owner.165
In light of these concerns with the use of eminent domain authority,
it is no wonder that the eminent domain legal regime has spawned disaf-
fection with the legal system.166  Reflecting this disaffection, forty-three
states have adopted post-Kelo revisions purportedly to limit eminent do-
main authority.167  The “Kelo backlash,” as one scholar has characterized
it, “probably resulted in more new state legislation than any other Su-
preme Court decision in history.”168  Yet disaffection persists.169
questioning whether undercompensation is serious problem, and also summariz-
ing various federal and state “legal entitlements to above-market compensation”).
164. Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir.
1988); see also Barros, supra note 136, at 299 (“When the taken property is a home
. . . market value compensation fails to compensate the owner for the personal
interest in the home.”).
165. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (“Al-
though the market-value standard is a useful and generally sufficient tool for ascer-
taining the compensation required to make the owner whole, the Court has
acknowledged that such an award does not necessarily compensate for all values an
owner may derive from his property.” (footnote omitted)).
166. See generally Timothy J. Dowling, How to Think About Kelo After the Shouting
Stops, in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: Kelo in Context, supra note 132; Nadler
& Diamond, supra note 31, at 736 (noting that term of ownership and type of
proposed use affected extent to which participants thought government’s motives
were good).  Those who owned the property for a long time were especially likely
to believe that the government’s motives were bad when the use was a mall or
unspecified, rather than a hospital. See id.
167. See Enacted Legislation Since Kelo, CASTLE COALITION, http://www.
castlecoalition.org/index.php?option= com_content&task=view&id=510 (last vis-
ited Mar. 4, 2012) (explaining limitations adopted by various states). But see
Somin, supra note 125, at 2114 (“With some important exceptions, the legislative
response to Kelo has fallen short of expectations.  At both the state and federal
level, most of the newly enacted laws are likely to impose few, if any, meaningful
restrictions on economic-development takings.”).
168. Somin, supra note 125, at 2102; see also Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31,
at 714 (noting that “[a] multitude of reform laws in many states followed quickly
on the heels of the [Kelo] decision, with the declared purpose to limit the govern-
ment’s ability to exercise its power of eminent domain”).  For another review of
responses to Kelo, see Steven J. Eagle & Lauren A. Perotti, Coping with Kelo: A
Potpourri of Legislative and Judicial Responses, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 799
(2008).
169. See Heller & Hills, supra note 107, at 1490 (noting that eminent domain
is “an increasingly embattled concept at both the state and federal levels”); see also
Somin, supra note 125, at 2103-04 (finding that “the majority of the newly enacted
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Our findings about the salience of procedural justice features, dis-
cussed in Part IV, offer an alternative framework for reducing dissatisfac-
tion with governments’ exercise of eminent domain power to the
normative recommendations for reforming eminent domain law that are
commonly in play.170  We briefly summarize below three other options for
reducing disaffection before offering some thoughts about how our find-
ings might help to ameliorate concerns.
One strategy to reduce dissatisfaction with eminent domain is to
abandon use of such authority.  Conceptually, eminent domain transforms
property ownership from what one might characterize as a property rule
to a liability rule.171  That is, instead of a property owner’s ability to make
the decision to retain or sell his property on his own (a property rule),
eminent domain divests an owner of the power to make this threshold
decision, leaving the owner with a liability rule-based remedy of compensa-
tion.  As Nadler and Diamond have nicely described it:
The vulnerability associated with being targeted for a non-tradi-
tional condemnation violates the traditional understanding of
land that gives the owner a right to exclude all others, to give up
ownership only if she chooses and to set the price at which she is
willing to sell. . . .  Eminent domain, as a general matter, violates
that expectation by both forcing the sale and setting the price.
The property owner faced with an exercise of eminent domain
has a right only to compensation—a liability rule that entitles the
injured party to damages—rather than the right to prevent the
transfer—a property rule that would enable the property owner
to avoid being injured at all.172
An extreme default position is to flip the status quo completely from a
liability rule to a property rule on the ground that personal interest in
property should trump other interests and, therefore, only willing sales
post-Kelo reform laws are likely to be ineffective,” although also noting that some
states have enacted effective reform laws).
170. Cf. 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 35-37 (discussing variabil-
ity in “behaviorally informed approaches” thus highlighting importance of paying
attention to context in formulating possible fixes).  Jurisdictions differ in the pro-
cedures they use for eminent domain, and also in the alternative procedures they
have established. See id.  Actions to operationalize our proposed procedural jus-
tice-based framework in particular contexts obviously should occur with this varia-
bility in mind.  To extend Professor Garnett’s observation, jurisdictions have
developed processes for eminent domain that incorporate several procedural jus-
tice features of the sort we discuss in this Article.  We do not purport to evaluate
particular procedures in use in different jurisdictions, or the extent to which such
procedures address the issues we raise in this Article. See Garnett, supra note 31, at
104.
171. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing
two rules and differences between them).
172. Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 723.
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should be allowed.173  This “fix” would effectively eliminate use of emi-
nent domain authority.  Such an approach raises obvious efficiency con-
cerns, as has been discussed elsewhere.174  This extreme default position,
which has won few adherents, seems unlikely to be adopted and we do not
spend more time on it.175  Our focus, instead, is on whether there are ways
to “save” eminent domain in terms of public acceptability without aban-
doning it as a policy option.
Professor Garnett notes that the fixes attempted to date to address
complaints about eminent domain authority have primarily focused on
one of two strategies: narrowing the scope of eminent domain authority
(e.g., by defining “public use” narrowly) or making it more expensive for
governments to exercise such authority by increasing the amount of com-
pensation required.176  Beginning with the former, the Fifth Amendment
only allows a government to take private property for “public uses.”177
Commentators have offered a broad range of creative approaches to limit
the public uses for which governments may use eminent domain author-
ity.178  Professor Barros, for example, cites arguments that eminent do-
173. Radin seems to argue for this default position. See Radin, supra note 61,
at 959-60; see also Barros, supra note 136, at 281 (“Radin makes a broad moral claim
that the personal interest of an individual possessing a home should trump com-
peting fungible interests.”).  Professors Nadler and Diamond speculate that the
lack of a property rule, and the resulting limits on an owner’s leverage, may ex-
plain the “general antipathy to eminent domain and why the public found Kelo so
objectionable.”  Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 723.
174. See, e.g., Heller & Hills, supra note 107, at 1467, 1469, 1489-90 (2008)
(proposing that land assembly districts replace eminent domain in some contexts,
but also noting that “[f]rom an efficiency standpoint, we need eminent domain to
consolidate overly fragmented land” and discussing notion of “anticommons—the
wasteful underuse caused by too-abundant entitlement holders”); Parchomovsky &
Siegelman, supra note 146, at 77 (summarizing literature that identifies concerns
with property rule and favors liability rule approach).  Despite the significant
amount of legislative activity following the Kelo decision, relatively few jurisdictions
have acted to circumscribe use of eminent domain authority significantly.  Somin,
supra note 125, at 2105.  Professor Garnett alludes to this fix in the limited context
of properties with high subjective value.  Garnett, supra note 31, at 111-19 (noting
that “third possibility” is that governments “simply may avoid taking properties
with high subjective value”).
175. We acknowledge the possibility that the use of a liability rule rather than
a property rule, and the power distribution it represents, may be a significant cause
of dissatisfaction. See Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 723 (“The difference in
power . . . makes it understandable that property owners prefer a property rule to a
liability rule.  It may also explain the general antipathy to eminent domain and
why the public found Kelo so objectionable”).  We also acknowledge, but do not
discuss, innovative ideas that would transform the nature of a property rule. See,
e.g., Heller & Hills, supra note 107.
176. Garnett, supra note 31, at 110-11 (“Academic discussions tend to assume
that there are two ways to minimize the risk of undercompensation.  The first solu-
tion is substantive limits on the use of eminent domain. . . .  The second solution
. . . is more money.” (footnotes omitted)).
177. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 545 (2005).
178. See, e.g., Barros, supra note 136, at 297-300; Nadler & Diamond, supra
note 31, at 724; see also Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 146, at 130-32.  Pro-
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main could be made available only after a finding that the property could
not be purchased voluntarily and that there is no reasonable alternative
course of action that would achieve the same public goal (this is in some
ways similar to the “no practicable alternative” approach pursuant to sec-
tion 404 of the Clean Water Act).179  In Kelo, the government exercised its
eminent domain authority to pave the way for a redevelopment project
with multiple uses by buying out private land owners whose homes could
in no way be considered “blighted.”180  These facts embody some of the
variables that critics have recommended be addressed in urging that use
of eminent domain authority be restricted: no resales to private parties, a
requirement that properties be blighted as a condition precedent for use
of eminent domain, etc.181  Conceptually, limiting the scope of eminent
domain by narrowing the circumstances in which a government may exer-
cise such authority qualifies as a property rule approach to reform because it
enables an owner not to sell his property unless he chooses to.182  While
narrowing the scope of “public uses” for which eminent domain may be
used is clearly an option and has received considerable attention,183
Professors Nadler and Diamond’s finding that respondents were “only
moderately sensitive to the purpose of a taking” raises questions about the
extent to which reforms based on limitations in uses may be enough on
their own to address disaffection.184
fessor Garnett suggests that “most of the state and federal proposals under consid-
eration would impose substantive limits on the eminent domain power.”  Garnett,
supra note 31, at 105.
179. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
180. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473-74.  For one of many summaries of the Kelo facts, see
Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 718-19.
181. See Garnett, supra note 31, at 103 (noting that Kelo “prompt[ed] federal
and state efforts to impose legislatively the restrictions on eminent domain that the
Supreme Court rejected in Kelo”). See generally Somin, supra note 125 (discussing
legislative responses to decision).
182. See Garnett, supra note 31, at 137; Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at
723.
183. See Garnett, supra note 31, at 103 (noting that Kelo “prompt[ed] federal
and state efforts to impose legislatively the restrictions on eminent domain that the
Supreme Court rejected in Kelo.”). See generally Somin, supra note 125 (discussing
legislative responses to decision).
184. Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 715, 742-45 (noting that they found
“little effect of the purpose of the taking on willingness to sell” and “that the plain-
tiffs’ relationship to their property in Kelo, even more than the nature of the public
purpose at issue, may have encouraged public outrage”).  Along the same lines,
they suggest that the owners’ relationship to the property may be more salient
than the public purpose at issue in the taking. See id. at 745.  Other commentators
have similarly suggested that narrowing public use will not ameliorate dissatisfac-
tion with use of eminent domain by authorities because the “real problem” has to
do with the requirement of just compensation.  Fee, supra note 160, at 126 (sug-
gesting “current injustices in eminent domain are not primarily the product of an
unreasonably broad concept of public use.  Rather, the root of the problem lies
with the current system’s failure to require adequate compensation”).
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A third strategy to address disaffection involves a normative fix to emi-
nent domain law that focuses on the other key requirement in the Fifth
Amendment for use of eminent domain authority, notably the require-
ment that “just compensation” be paid.185  Increasing compensation quali-
fies as changing the content of the liability rule that governs use of eminent
domain authority.186  This fix involves changing how just compensation is
measured.  A variety of prominent scholars have suggested that “more
money” is an answer to the eminent domain conundrum.187  Scholars
have offered alternative approaches to addressing the valuation issue.188
Some have recommended using a “premium” approach, or a fair market
value methodology in which compensation would exceed fair market
value by some percentage, such as 125 or 150 percent.189  Others have
looked to various indicia of ownership, such as time of ownership, to de-
termine compensation.190  Still others have claimed that we should deter-
mine compensation based on the proposed use of the parcel.191
With some exceptions, however, proposed fixes to this valuation co-
nundrum have largely foundered to date.192  Because of the significant
185. Fee, supra note 160, at 126.
186. See Garnett, supra note 31, at 137; Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at
723.
187. See, e.g., Barros, supra note 136, at 300 (suggesting as possible additional
sources of compensation: providing moving expenses, providing reasonable attor-
ney’s fees if owner successfully challenges government’s valuation, and providing
sliding-scale premium based on length of residence in home).  Barros contends
that each approach would “come closer to making the homeowner whole” and
would “provide incentives for governments to obtain property through voluntary
market transactions rather than through eminent domain and to take homes only
when truly needed for the public interest.” Id.; see also Fee, supra note 160, at 134
(suggesting “tort”-like, case-by-case approach or “statutory formula that approxi-
mates certain damage elements,” such as formula that establishes emotional dam-
ages as percentage of market value based on length of ownership). But see Garnett,
supra note 31, at 104 (concluding that “universal disregard for how eminent do-
main works outside of the courtroom may have led previous commentators—
again, including me—to overstate the undercompensation problem.”).
188. See Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 724 (summarizing several pro-
posals); Merrill, supra note 128, at 84 (same).
189. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY & THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 174-75 (1985); John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 815-17 (2006).
190. Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 724.
191. See id.; see also James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 865-68 (suggesting that compensation should be tied to
“publicness” of project—if more public, then less compensation should be pro-
vided).  For one review of laws that require payment of more than fair market
value, see Garnett, supra note 31, at 105.
192. There are, of course, some exceptions.  For a further discussion of the
variability in eminent domain processes and in valuation approaches, see supra
note 83.  For examples of several communities that provide for compensation well
above market value, see Timothy J. Dowling, How to Think About Kelo After the Shout-
ing Stops, 38 URB. LAW. 191, 198 (2006).  Professor John Fee, however, has noted:
“Some eminent domain statutes provide additional elements of compensation,
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challenges in incorporating sentimental value and other factors into the
eminent domain process,193 the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
switch from the obviously second-best extant scheme of market valuation.
In United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land,194 the Court highlighted the “seri-
ous practical difficulties in assessing the worth an individual places on par-
ticular property at a given time” and justified using market value as a proxy
as a result.195  Judge Posner makes this point as well:
Many people place a value on their homes that exceeds its mar-
ket price.  But a standard of subjective value in eminent domain
cases, while the correct standard as a matter of economic princi-
ple, would be virtually impossible to administer because of the
difficulty of proving . . . that the house was worth more to the
owner than the market price.196
Process changes that bolster legitimacy may be helpful even if
changes in valuation formulae are implemented that lead to more com-
pensation and increased satisfaction as a result.  Nadler and Diamond
opine that while increased compensation might help defuse public out-
rage, Kelo and “its accompanying backlash suggest that the divide between
the law of property and the psychology of property is about more than just
money.”197  Based on their experiments, they conclude that, for some peo-
ple, increasing compensation to incorporate subjective valuation was
“wholly insufficient.”198
The bottom line is that, to date, none of these three fixes seeking to
ameliorate public outrage with the exercise of eminent domain authority
such as relocation expenses, but even these usually come far short of fully compen-
sating affected owners.”  Fee, supra note 160, at 136 n.25.
193. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 31, at 147; Heller & Hills, supra note 107, at
1479.
194. 441 U.S. 506 (1979).
195. Id. at 511.  The Court also acknowledged that fair market value is not
necessarily the appropriate standard. See id.; see also JACK L. KNETSCH, PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND COMPENSATION: COMPULSORY ACQUISITION AND OTHER LOSSES 37
(1983) (discussing “intuitive appeal” of “notion of value-to-the-owner” but stating
“courts have had difficulty giving the concept specific or definitive meaning”);
Merrill, supra note 128, at 82-85 (offering “refined model”). See generally Shelley
Ross Saxer & David L. Callies, Is Fair Market Value Just Compensation?  An Underlying
Issue Surfaced in Kelo, in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: Kelo in Context, supra
note 132, at 137, 148-54 (discussing Court’s jurisprudence on appropriateness of
fair market value standard and reviewing state flexibility to include additional fac-
tors beyond fair market value in calculation of just compensation).
196. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 531 (6th ed. 2003); ac-
cord Merrill, supra note 128, at 83 (identifying “subjective premium” that owners
may place on their property).
197. Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 715.
198. See id. at 715, 723 (concluding that in some cases “no amount of money”
would compensate for loss of person’s property, and finding that strength of
owner’s ties to property, including length of time of ownership, was significant
factor concerning willingness to sell).
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has succeeded.199  We have not eliminated use of eminent domain in or-
der to save it.  Efforts to limit use of eminent domain authority have been
uneven and there is some evidence that such a strategy is not likely suffi-
cient by itself to significantly ameliorate disaffection.200  Further, the
methodological challenges associated with increasing compensation have
complicated use of such an approach.
Our findings, discussed in Part IV, suggest that revamping eminent
domain processes so that participants and others view them as more fair or
just may help to promote satisfaction.201  Rather than focus exclusively on
the concepts that have received most of the attention to date, notably ad-
justments to property rules (e.g., limits on public use) or liability rules
(e.g., changing regimes for determining compensation),202 attention to
process holds potential for ameliorating high levels of dissatisfaction with
199. See Fee, supra note 160, at 136 n.25.
200. See Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 723.  Professor Somin con-
cluded that many of the responses to Kelo have been “largely symbolic in nature,
providing little or no protection for property owners,” although Somin also noted
that other responses had considerably more promise. See Somin, supra note 125, at
2105, 2138-48.
201. As Professor Garnett suggests, given the variability of eminent domain
practices and their opaqueness, “[m]ore study is needed to understand how emi-
nent domain works in practice,” and, in particular, how jurisdictions are develop-
ing specific plans for reform. See Garnett, supra note 31, at 149.  Many eminent
domain situations are resolved through pre-condemnation proceedings, in some
cases because the law obligates the government to negotiate before using eminent
domain. See id. at 126 (noting that what compensation owner receives “almost al-
ways results from a bargain between the owner and a Taker, rather than a judicial
determination of the property’s fair market value.  State and federal laws require
Takers, in most instances, to seek to purchase property on the market before
resorting to eminent domain” (footnote omitted)).
202. For a further discussion of liability rules, see supra notes 170-83 and ac-
companying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-2\VLR201.txt unknown Seq: 49  6-AUG-12 12:12
2012] WHAT HAS LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT? 257
eminent domain procedures,203 and others that involve highly salient sen-
timental values.204
Professors Michael Heller and Rick Hills offer an innovative proposal
for revamping use of eminent domain that ties in nicely with some of our
findings about process features that may enhance a sense of fairness.205
They argue for the creation of “Land Assembly Districts” as an alternative
to eminent domain in some circumstances.  Their proposal includes a ref-
erendum feature that would empower members of a district to vote to
determine whether to accept a proposal to buy the property that com-
prises the district.  Our findings about the value of referenda for building
trust and engendering a sense of fairness, particularly when sentimental
values are salient, offers empirical support for their idea for incorporation
of a referendum process as part of a potential sale in order to enhance a
sense of fairness.206  Further work is needed to evaluate the likely accepta-
bility of the particular voting mechanisms they proposed.
203. Our approach is not exclusive.  We are not proposing an either/or set of
strategic options in which policy makers have to choose between changing their
methodologies for calculating a just compensation, restricting the use of eminent
domain authority, or our third approach.  Instead, we view our approach as com-
plementary in the sense that it gives policy makers an additional tool to consider in
attempting to improve decision-making when sentimental values are highly senti-
ent.  It goes without saying that the value of new or revised procedures in bolster-
ing the procedural justice of the procedures used depends on the extant
procedures as well as on the changes made.  As indicated above, procedures vary
considerably throughout the country. See supra notes 73-117 and accompanying
text; see also NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 31, § G2A.03 (listing varia-
tion of procedures in different states); Garnett, supra note 31, at 105, 126-30.  Our
Article provides a framework-level review of litigation as a procedure rather than a
review of particular procedures used in particular jurisdictions.  As Professor Gar-
nett states, “Because the negotiations between property owners and Takers are
opaque and decentralized, it is difficult to obtain information about how the bar-
gaining process works.”  Garnett, supra note 31, at 130.  Garnett suggests that
“quick-take” procedures, which permit the government to obtain title before the
final judgment in an eminent domain action, may be particularly problematic
from a procedural justice perspective because they do not include a right to be
heard before the government acts and may “preclude the effective exercise of
‘voice.’” Id. at 128.  In terms of possible complementarity of approaches, Garnett
recognizes that more money may often not be enough when dignitary harms are
high, such as when the government requires the sale of land from one private
party to another. See id. at 137.
204. It is well established that plaintiffs in a wide range of settings often have
non-monetary interests, including in the medical malpractice, torts, divorce, gen-
eral injury, and small claims arenas. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 106, at 3
(describing reasons why 9/11 victim compensation fund is another arena in which
non-monetary values are of substantial importance). See generally William L.F. Fel-
stiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming
. . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 631-32, 650-51 (1981).
205. See generally Heller & Hills, supra note 107.
206. For a further discussion of our findings about the value of referenda for
building trust and engendering a sense of fairness, see supra notes 75-118 and ac-
companying text.  Professor Somin’s finding that “[t]he major exceptions to the
pattern of ineffective post-Kelo reforms are the eleven states that recently enacted
reforms by popular referendum” seems to offer some support for our respondents
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Nadler and Diamond suggest the promise of a procedurally oriented
approach as well, while acknowledging that much remains to be learned to
determine which changes will be most effective.  After concluding that
subjective attachment affects perceptions of justice, and in particular “re-
veal[s] the limits of case law and traditional economic analysis in under-
standing Kelo and eminent domain,” they suggest that “a more democratic
model for the law and policies dealing with takings” holds promise for
enhancing legitimacy.207
Our study lends support to this conclusion and offers some specific
guideposts about the types of procedural changes that are likely to be most
effective in persuading people that the process is fair and protects senti-
mental as well as monetary values.  As we discuss in Part IV, those features
should include meaningful opportunities for voice, respectful treatment,
and neutrality.208  Beyond this, our findings suggest that the search for
voice must be a careful one because there are pitfalls if the “wrong” types
of processes are adopted.  Some opportunities for voice appear to be re-
markably ineffectual, notably the types of voice provided by public hear-
ings.  Our respondents viewed public hearings to be relatively
unacceptable as mechanisms for making decisions.  Further, their view was
that such hearings did not do an effective job of protecting either mone-
tary or sentimental value.209
Other scholars have offered insights about the types of voice that may
be effective as well.  Professor Tamara Relis, for example, in a study of
different types of litigation, found a significant disconnect between the
objectives of plaintiffs and their attorneys.210  This suggests that simply al-
lowing a party’s lawyers a voice may not be enough to satisfy the party that
who thought highly of referenda as protective of their interests. See Somin, supra
note 125, at 2105.  Somin’s further finding that citizen-initiated referendum initia-
tives “have led to the passage of much stronger laws than those enacted through
referenda initiated by state legislatures” highlights the need for further analysis
that unpacks the value of different types of referenda processes. See id.
207. See Nadler & Diamond, supra note 31, at 748.
208. See supra notes 74-117 and accompanying text. Compare HIBBING &
THEISS-MORSE, supra note 117 (raising questions about efficacy of voice), with Mar-
kell & Tyler, supra note 10, at 3 (“Rhetoric in support of extensive and meaningful
public engagement has not necessarily matched reality.”).
209. For a further discussion of how such hearings did not do an effective job
of protecting monetary or sentimental value, see supra notes 84-117 and accompa-
nying text, especially Table 1.
210. See Relis, supra note 106, at 702.  Professor Relis found a significant dis-
connect, or “discontinuity,” between plaintiffs’ objectives and those of their law-
yers.  The plaintiffs’ objectives “were thickly composed of extra-legal aims of
principle,” such as acknowledgements of harm and admissions of fault, while law-
yers conceived the goal to be “solely or predominantly for money.” See id.  In Re-
lis’s words, claimants’ desires “remain invisible” to their lawyers in many cases. Id.
at 707.  Relis found that “[p]laintiffs’ articulations of their litigation objectives
rarely correlated with what legal actors perceived as their prime litigation aims.”
Id. at 721.  Plaintiffs want non-monetary relief while lawyers want money and think
that is what the cases are about.
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his or her views have been heard.  Professor Relis’s findings that a client’s
sentimental values are especially likely to receive short shrift from the cli-
ent’s lawyers and, as a result, from the relevant tribunal, reinforce the
need to think twice before concluding that voice for a lawyer will be
deemed by a client to be voice for the client.211  A party for whom senti-
mental value is important is unlikely to have those issues vetted effectively
by his or her attorney and is unlikely to feel he or she has had a voice.212
Gillian K. Hadfield makes some of the same points regarding adminis-
tration of the 9/11 fund.  She reported finding that potential claimants
(people who had been injured by the 9/11 terrorist attacks or lost a family
member) “saw much more at stake than monetary compensation.”213
Hadfield noted that some, including Ken Feinberg, who served as special
master for the Victim Compensation Fund (VCF), had effectively
“equat[ed] . . . litigation interests with monetary interests” and suggested
that such a characterization is “increasingly common in the legal profes-
sion.”214 Like Professor Relis, Professor Hadfield suggested that while law-
yers often see issues in terms of a “financial calculation,” for some
potential claimants that was not the case.215  Instead, Hatfield suggests
that in the VCF context “litigation represents more . . . than a means to
satisfying private material ends; it represents principled participation in a
process that is constitutive of a community.”216
211. See id.  Professor Relis found that even when plaintiffs’ putative objectives
are “transformed” into aims that their lawyers believe are legally realistic, “plain-
tiffs’ extra-legal aims of principle do not dissipate after dispute transformation by
their lawyers.” Id. at 706; see also id. at 728 (noting that findings “negate arguments
that lawyers’ conditioning of plaintiffs on legal system ‘realities’ results in claim-
ants materially revising the aims of principle they seek from the justice system”).
Relis acknowledges that the data, while providing “one of several windows on moti-
vation,” adds to the “scant depth of research on the needs of plaintiffs and why
they sue.” Id. at 708 n.15.  Our study should be viewed in a similar light: we pro-
vide a window into peoples’ perceptions that adds to the research on the percep-
tions of stakeholders.
212. See id. at 706.  Relis suggests pre-litigation fixes to these issues, including
direct dialogue early on in litigation between defense counsel and plaintiffs so that
plaintiffs can articulate their extra-legal objectives. See id. at 709.
213. Hadfield, supra note 106, at 645.
214. Id. at 646.
215. See id. at 662 (“It was clear that for [some] respondents, litigation was not
about pursuing a pot of gold. . . .  Rather, the choice as they saw it was it was about
relinquishing gold in favor of something they saw as more important.”).  People
chose to litigate, rather than be compensated for losses from the victims’ compen-
sation fund, because they wanted information about the terrorist attacks and re-
lated events, wanted accountability for wrongdoing that had enabled the attacks to
occur, and wanted to promote change so that the “system” worked better. See id. at
662-65.  Fairness or reasonableness of fund payments played a relatively small role
in at least some of the respondents’ decisions as to whether to accept such pay-
ments.  Non-monetary payments played a much more significant role. See id.
216. Id. at 649.  Hadfield’s focus is on prospective plaintiffs in litigation,
which is, to use her term, a different framing than for owners in eminent domain
situations.
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Our study both supports and builds on the foundation that Nadler
and Diamond have laid in the eminent domain context, and which Relis
and Hadfield have helped to create in other legal arenas in which senti-
mental values are salient.  Their work, in different arenas, suggests that a
reality of the legal process is that it does not focus particularly well on non-
monetary values and that this led to dissatisfaction by participants.  Our
findings both lend support to that view and also offer a promising path for
improvement by suggesting that careful incorporation of key procedural
justice features may help to reduce disaffection.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The findings of our study provide support for several important in-
sights into policy design.  First, process design needs to be approached
contextually.  Stakeholders’ value processes differently depending on the
values at stake.  As a result, the values held by relevant stakeholders should
influence policy design.  Second, as a normative matter, when sentimental
values are important, procedural justice is particularly important to stake-
holders.  Moreover, a particular aspect of procedural justice, notably trust
in the decision-maker, is especially important to engender satisfaction with
the procedures used.  In contrast, when monetary values predominate, a
different aspect of procedural justice, notably neutrality, stands out in im-
portance in influencing satisfaction.  Third, our findings indicate that peo-
ple do not view the acceptability of decision-making procedures in a
vacuum.  Instead, an exogenous variable, notably a person’s degree of
trust in government, affects the person’s satisfaction with resolving dis-
putes using a particular type of decision-making process.  A person with
low levels of trust in government is likely to distrust a process that vests
power in a government decision-maker; instead, processes that vest power
elsewhere are likely to be attractive (such as the referendum process we
asked about).  We consider our findings in the context of a particularly
contentious legal arena, eminent domain law, and suggest that they offer a
framework based in the procedural justice literature for reducing extant
levels of public outrage that may complement the search for outcome-
based reforms that has received the vast majority of attention so far.
